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Engle: Knight's Gambit to Fool's Mate: Beyond Legal Realism

KNIGHT’S GAMBIT TO FOOL’S MATE:
BEYOND LEGAL REALISM
Eric Engle*
I. INTRODUCTION
In chess, a gambit is to offer a piece to draw an opponent into a
worse position. Knights are often gambited early in the game because
they can enter play quickly and are of low value later in the game. This
Article discusses a different type of gambit: the gambit made by
progressives in taking up the idea of moral relativism in the hope to
thereby critique the failed conservative morality. But that gambit draws
the Left into a fool’s mate, a rapid and unexpected reversal of fortunes.
By taking the gambit, the Left becomes trapped and immobilized by the
erroneous belief that normative inferencing is impossible.
That
erroneous belief paralyzes any moral critique and transforms all
arguments into economic ones.
Political discourse of the last thirty years in America has been
effectively monopolized by the political Right. The American Left has,
across the board, failed in its efforts to develop a coherent program1 to
use law as a tool for reform, whether radical or gradual.2 Why is that?3
We can look at any issue, whether political and defined around interests
groups (women,4 non-whites, homosexuals,5 and criminals),6 or
M.Sc., Computer Science, Universität Bremen (currently writing thesis); Dr. Jur. Univ.
Bremen, LL.M. Eur. Univ. Bremen; D.E.A., Fiscalité et Finances Publiques, Université de
Paris II; D.E.A., Théorie Générale du Droit, University of Paris X Nanterre; J.D., Saint Louis
University School of Law; B.A., Queen’s University, Canada. I thank Professor John
Griesbach at St. Louis for putting me into the labyrinth of legal theory, presenting
questions that led to more questions. I also thank Professor Christophe Grzegorczyk of the
Centre de Théorie du Droit, Paris Nanterre. He too did not present answers. Rather, he
gave me a method—first, look at onotology, then epistemology, and finally axiology. That
was the thread of Ariadne which led me to the answers I propose here. Finally, I want to
thank the editors of the Valparaiso University Law Review for their intellectual discipline,
moral courage, and hard work.
1
Paul H. Brietzke, Urban Development and Human Development, 25 IND. L. REV. 741, 755
n.46 (1991).
2
See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87
VA. L. REV. 1045, 1083 (2001). See generally Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern
Newspeak and Constitutional “Meaning” for the Uninitiated, 96 MICH. L. REV. 461 (1997).
3
One suggestion is that the failure is due to alternative proposals by the Left. I
disagree. Alternatives were proposed, attempts were made at implementation, yet
proposed projects were not in fact implemented or immediately rolled back. See, e.g.,
Martha Minow, School Reform Outside Laboratory Conditions, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 333, 335 (2003) (supposed lack of alternative propositions).
4
An example is the failure of the federal Equal Rights Amendment. William P.
Gunnar, The Fundamental Law that Shapes the United States Health Care System: Is Universal
*
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economic and of general interest (health insurance,7 pensions,
unemployment insurance, and poverty relief).8 In each and every case,
the Left agenda, whether redistributive9 or social, has been routed. At
the same time, the current United States government has squandered a
budget surplus built by Democrats,10 along with the goodwill of the
entire world11 and the American people,12 in a counterproductive war in

Health Care Realistic Within the Established Paradigm?, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 151, 178 n.226
(2006).
5
See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 236, 248 (2006).
6
E.g., Lucy C. Ferguson, The Implications of Developmental Cognitive Research on “Evolving
Standards of Decency” and the Imposition of the Death Penalty on Juveniles, 54 AM. U. L. REV.
441, 442 (2004) (reconstitutionalization of the death penalty).
7
Bruce Spitz & John Abramson, When Health Policy Is the Problem: A Report from the Field,
30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 327, 338 (2005).
8
Daniel B. Klaff, Evaluating Work: Enforcing Occupational Safety and Health Standards in
the United States, Canada and Sweden, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 613, 617 (2005) (failure of
President Johnson’s Great Society program).
9
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Study on Paths to a “Better Way”: Litigation, Alternatives, and
Accommodation, Background Paper, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824, 835.
10
Nancy-Ann DeParle, Medicare at 40: A Mid-Life Crisis?, 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 70,
96 (2004).
When the Bush Administration took office in January 2001, the
Congressional Budget Office projected a $5.6 trillion surplus over the
next ten years. Now the surplus is gone—thanks in no small part to a
$1.7 trillion tax cut—and the government faces deficits as far as the
CBO computers can calculate.
Id. George Anastaplo, Law, Judges, and the Principles of Regimes: Explorations, 70 TENN. L.
REV. 455, 487 n.116 (2003) (“We have seen, since this 1992 talk, that remarkable switch in
positions which has had a Democratic Administration presiding over a Budget surplus and
a Republican Administration preparing to preside over an unprecedented Budget deficit.”).
11
For a brief and powerful moment, most of the rest of the world
genuinely shared our loss. Most were prepared to support us in
almost every conceivable way to win the war on terrorism. Needlessly
and senselessly, we have squandered that good will. How? In part, by
employing bullying rhetoric (as President Bush did in his address to
Congress on September 20, 2001, when he said, “either you are with
us, or you are with the terrorists”), by reinforcing perceptions of
American bias in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and by demanding the
world fall in line, on our schedule and on the basis of shifting
rationales, to depose Saddam Hussein.
George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People (Sept. 21,
2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html;
Susan E. Rice, U.S. National Security Policy Post-9/11: Perils and Prospects, FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF., Winter 2004, at 133-34.
12
“We have to renew the spirit of national purpose, unity, and resolve we showed after
September 11th—and which George W. Bush has squandered since.” In Their Own Words:
The 2004 U.S. Presidential Candidates on Foreign Policy, Joseph I. Lieberman, FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF, Winter 2004, at 5, 21.
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Iraq.13
Yet we see no presidential impeachment, neither for
incompetence nor for lying and sending Americans to perish in the
desert in search of nonexistent weapons of mass destruction. The failure
of the Left could not be more complete.
This Article traces and explains the failure of the Left’s agenda in
legal discourse.14 Particularly, this Article discusses the failure of the
Left to implement its agenda. Affirmative action? Racial profiling.
Women’s rights? Feminazis. Prison reform? Three strikes. Further, the
Left’s comprehensive failure due to its adoption of a failed axiology is
explained.
Axiology is the theory of values—the theory of choice of determinant
values. The Left adopted moral relativism as early as the 1930s in the
work of the legal realists. But relativist axiology has taken the Left
nowhere because it is inaccurate; the Left’s erroneous relativist axiology
is the result of an erroneous epistemology.15
Thus, the correct
epistemological foundations needed in order to obtain a correct theory of
moral choice must first be exposed and clarified. The failed relativist
axiology results from a confused and incoherent relativist epistemology.
The incoherent relativist epistemology is, in turn, the result of a confused
ontology; ontology is the theory of being—the science of determining the
basic nature of existence. A correct and coherent epistemology is needed
13
“[W]hatever legal and political capital that the United States and its military campaign
fuelled in the run up to ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ was effectively squandered away in
the rash and ill-advised ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom.’” Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto,
Countering Terrorism: From Wigged Judges to Helmeted Soldiers—Legal Perspectives on America’s
Counter-Terrorism Responses, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 243, 293 (2005). “Indeed, instead of
working for progress toward a rule of law, . . . the Bush Administration [is] lurching
toward a rule of scofflaw.” John W. Head, Responding to 9/11: Lurching Toward a Rule of
Scofflaw, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, Fall 2005, at 4.
14
Ackerman seems to blame the failure of the Left on psychological and mass
psychological grounds. Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1519, 1528 (1997) (new Left failed due to psychological grounds); Bruce Ackerman,
Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 489-90 (1989) (new Left failed due
to mass psychology). If the Left just needed a good therapist, it would have been in power
ages ago. Others also think the failure of the Left is due to psychological factors:
“Ironically, it turns out that the American intellectual left failed in large part because they
somehow mistakenly assumed that everyone, at base, was like them.” David M. Smolin,
The Dilemmas and Methodologies of Academic Political Liberalism: An Analysis of Professor
Lawrence Friedman’s Response to the Problem of Violent Crime, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 959, 972 (199697). But, in fact, most people are like each other. Psychology does not explain the failure of
the Left. The Reagans and Bushes are every bit as dysfunctional as the Clintons. Although
this Article rejects the psychological failure thesis, the fact that intellectuals are so off base
that they are looking at psychology, as if politics were a talk show or a sitcom, shows the
shallowness of contemporary United States political discourse.
15
Epistemology is the theory of knowledge.
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to find a well-founded theory of moral choice, which is necessary for
legal reforms. To obtain a correct epistemology, a correct ontology is
required. Determine the correct ontology, and the epistemology
basically falls into place. Rectify the epistemology, and the axiology falls
into place. Rectify the axiology, and legal methodology and political
agenda fall into place. With a correct theory of moral values, the Left is
more likely to implement its substantive policies.
Thus, this Article addresses the goal—implementing certain ideas—
in reverse order. First, the essential nature of the problem—its
ontology—is diagnosed in Part II. Certain basic propositions of the
theory of knowledge (epistemology) are then determined, which must be
understood in order to move to the next step. From a correct
epistemological perspective, this Article moves forward to a correct
theory of choice of values (axiology) in Part III. Then, with a basic
understanding of a correct ontology, epistemology, and axiology, it is
possible to properly situate American legal and political discourse,
understand its potential and limits, and resituate that discourse and its
legal methods as part of a coherent framework for fundamental change.
This contextualization permits one to pose and answer fundamental
questions of legal theory (methods of interpretation) and political
practice (finalities of U.S. foreign policy), which is the topic of Part IV.
More specifically, a materialist ontology leads to a monist
epistemology, and thus an objective epistemology. Materialism and
monism preclude dualist noetic theories such as platonism and neoplatonism. Avoiding platonism also avoids confusion resulting from
needless multiplication of intentional entities. On the basis of the
materialist epistemology, a correct cognitivist axiology can be attained
and an incorrect relativist axiology will be avoided. Cognitivism is
simply the idea that moral values are knowable, that we can have
knowledge of what is meant by “good” and “bad” acts. Cognitivist
axiology allows the Left to resituate arguments that have been pushed
into the economic arena from the moral arena. But the Left cannot
advance its agenda of equal rights in economic terms. Only by
resituating the discourse of equality back into the field of morality can
the Left hope to implement its views.
The Left’s discourse has failed.16 This was due to errors in
assumptions of the nature of reality.17 The Left’s goals may have been
16
See, e.g., Dennis H. Wrong, The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe,
17 CONTEMP. SOC. 381-83 (1988) (book review).
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unrealistic, but even realistic goals can only be attained on the basis of
correct understandings of the world as it is. In place of the failed
relativism of the Left, this Article uses a monist, materialist, holist, and
cognitivist method. This method is applied proceeding from
fundamentally prior concepts to their theoretical consequences. The
epistemological basis of realist legal method is examined in Part II. After
understanding materialist epistemology, Part III examines the axiological
consequences of the chosen theories. In Part IV, a discourse on legal
method flows logically from the mutually supporting theories of
ontology (materialism), epistemology (monism), and axiology
(cognitivism), which leads to a new theory of natural law with attendant
legal methods.
II. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL BASIS OF REALIST LEGAL METHOD
Late modern legal thought often suffers from confusion stemming
from two distinct but similar concepts: epistemological relativism18

See Richard Flacks, Reflections on Strategy in a Dark Time: Radical Democracy—A Relic of
the 60s, or an Idea Whose Time has Come?, BOSTON REV. (Dec. 1995/Jan. 1996), available at
http://bostonreview.net/BR20.6/flacks.html.
We in the new left assumed that the corporate-liberal model was the
only viable framework for sustaining modern capitalism. We assumed
that laissez-faire capitalism was a thing of the past, that economic
growth could now be permanently engineered by the corporate state,
and that a sense of social responsibility was prevalent among
corporate managers. And so, we tended to believe, the welfare state
did not need defence from the left—our job was to present its
conservative functions in dampening social unrest, expanding
consumer markets, and undermining class consciousness. The benefits
of corporate liberalism for the wider population were assumed by new
leftists to be well-established. Our goal was to undertake its critique
and try to create alternatives. Over the past 25 years, however, this
radical-democratic impulse of the New left has been lost. The
explanation of that loss begins in the early 1970s, when the fiscal crisis
of the state turned corporate elite consensus against The Model. With
corporate profits shrinking under the pressure of global economic
competition, elite consensus shifted toward the need to free capital for
global opportunities. That meant a lowering of living standards and
expectations for American workers, as well as a reduction in state
efforts to channel investment for domestic purposes. It was the
corporate-liberal state—not laissez-faire—that was obsolete.
Id.
18
“[T]he whole texture of twentieth century philosophical thought, which has produced
an epistemological relativism often said (with some justice) to underlie contemporary
liberalism.” Kevin F. Ryan, Lex et Ratio, VT. B.J., Apr. 2003, at 5, 12.
17
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(nihilism19
or
skepticism)
and
axiological
relativism20
(intersubjectivity).21 If a legal theorist employs either or both of these
related lines of thought carelessly, the result is the usual post-modern
confusion.22
This prudent council, to be careful to make one’s
presumptions known, would be met with approval by David Hume.23
19
For a sense of the depth of the split in U.S. legal discourse, see, e.g., Harry V. Jaffa,
Graglia’s Quarrel with God: Atheism and Nihilism Masquerading as Constitutional Argument, 4 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 715, 716 (1995) (commingling nihilism and relativism).
20
Axiology is merely the theory of choice of values. Some authors appear to confound
axiology and relativism. “Schmitt proposes a conceptual and historical analogy between
axiology (the theory of values as ethical relativism) and total war.” Jorge E. Dotti, Schmitt
Reads Marx, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1473, 1483-84 (2000). An objectivist axiology is also
possible.
21
See, e.g., Paul R. Tremblay, Shared Norms, Bad Lawyers, and the Virtues of Casuistry, 36
U.S.F. L. REV. 659, 677 (2002).
22
See Katherine C. Sheehan, Caring For Deconstruction, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 85, 95-96
(2000).
[A]ll its connections as well as all other attributes it may be thought to
possess, are accidental, contingent, or random, and furthermore, they
are so essentially. This is not an empirical, descriptive, tentative claim
about our modern nature, it is a transcendental claim about the nature
of nature. . . . [T]he postmodern self so dear to the heart of
postmodern theorists is . . . as changing, unstable, and unpredictable as
the wind. . . . To repeat, that inessential self is . . . not a hypothetical
description, subject to modification or amendment as new evidence
presents itself. It is a metaphysically transcendent truth. It is very
difficult to see what sort of idea West is describing here. At times West
seems to regard this postmodern self, like the liberal self, as a
description of an empirical entity—a claim about “the nature of
nature,” albeit one that the postmodernists dogmatically refuse to
allow to be contested or corrected by contrary evidence. Confusingly,
West depicts the postmodern self as “unstable, and unpredictable as
the wind,” implying that, like the weather, the postmodern self has a
real existence in the world, if one that is sometimes hard to keep track
of.
West’s declaration that the postmodern self is essentially
inessential is the sort of glib verbal manipulation feminists have
always had to endure in arguments with the patriarchy.
Id. (quoting ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997)). The problem is not with West or
with Feminism. The problem is with postmodernism. West is correct. The postmodern
sense of self—and anything else for that matter—is mutable because it is founded not on
objective empirical facts but subjective internal feelings. Postmodernism is one step short
of solipsism. West is just one example.
23
But see Francesco Parisi, Alterum Non Laedere: An Intellectual History of Civil Liability, 39
AM. J. JURIS. 317, 338 (1994).
David Hume challenged the scholastic notion of prudence,
underscoring the practical insufficiency of such a moral ideal in a
society of self-centered beings. In the Aristotelian ideal of prudence,
the goal of self-perfection of human character was paramount.
According to Hobbes, however, the self in need of perfection was
foreign to real political and legal concerns. In his view, of the four
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Moral relativism24 and post-modernism25 have been responsible for
confusion in legal thinking26 because of misinterpretations of Hume27
and Nietzsche.28
By addressing the philosophical roots of legal
methodology this Article seeks to clarify some of that confusion to
correct the methodology that flows from it, so that law can work justice.
Hume observes that those who make prescriptive arguments—
arguments about what one ought to do—generally make the following
mistake:29 the proponent of the argument will begin with a series of
descriptive statements—factual descriptions of reality as it is30—but the
argument’s proponent will reach a prescriptive conclusion—that one

cardinal virtues, only justice could maintain full dignity in a truly
positivist conception of law. While prudence and the other cardinal
virtues of courage and temperance remained desirable attributes of the
human character, they no longer could imply the existence of related
civil or legal obligations.
Id.
24
“[T]he emergence of moral relativism in Western thought, in which it is believed that
there are no objective truths and that morals are relative and subjective, has led
contemporary legal theories to reject natural law and other normative concepts.” Erin
Englebrecht, Three Fallacies of the Contemporary Legal Concept of Environmental Injury: An
Appeal to Enhance “One-Eyed Reason” with a Normative Consciousness, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 38
(2004).
25
“Hume deconstructed the self, and argued that the self was simply a bundle of
perceptions. The postmodernist conception can jokingly but pretty accurately be
characterized as ‘Hume plus advertising.’” Dale Jamieson, The Poverty of Postmodernist
Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 577, 585-86 (1991).
26
E.g., Samuel K. Murumba, Grappling with a Grotian Moment: Sovereignty and the Quest
for a Normative World Order, 19 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 829, 850 n.61 (1993). “The confusion of
targets identified in postmodernist theories also bedevils C[ritical] L[egal] S[tudies].” Id.
27
E.g., Steven Hetcher, Climbing the Walls of Your Electronic Cage, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1916,
1921-22 (2000) (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
(1999)). “Hume’s Law is sometimes stated as: An ought cannot be derived from an is. The
proper conception of Hume’s Law, however, is that an ought statement cannot be derived
merely from an is statement.” Id. This Article goes further and suggests that Hume was not
saying anything more than one must make his ought statements known and not confuse
them with his is statements.
28
Most frequently, people think that Nietzsche is saying that there is no morality, when
in fact Nietzsche was struggling to build a new morality.
29
See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469 (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H.
Nidditch eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) (1739-40) [hereinafter HUME, A TREATISE OF
HUMAN NATURE]. “In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of
reasoning . . . .” Id.
30
“[T]he author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and
establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs . . . .” Id.
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ought to do a certain thing.31 Hume’s critique is that the proponent of
the prescriptive argument has shifted from descriptive statements of
what “is” (“is” statements) to a prescriptive statement of what “ought”
to be done (“ought” statements).32 Hume implores proponents of
prescriptive arguments to explain how they make this transition from
descriptive “is” statements to prescriptive “ought” statements.33 That is
all Hume says on the subject—nothing more, nothing less. If one is to
mix statements of what is and what ought, one must make explicit the
prescriptive or descriptive nature of those statements and how one shifts
from description to prescription—for example, the major premise that
“one ought to be kind” and the minor premise that “torturing people is
not kind” with the conclusion that “thus, one ought not torture people.”
This is a perfectly valid syllogism of practical reasoning (phronesis) in
the form of modus ponens, and it is unambiguous because the “is” and
“ought” statements are explicit. One may attack either the major or
minor premise with no risk of confusion of an “is” statement with an
“ought” statement. If both the major and minor premises were “is”
statements with an “ought” conclusion, that might be per se invalid.
However, Hume does not get that explicit in his critique of
enthymematic “ought” statements. Even if “is” and “ought” statements
had to be distributed such that there was a prescriptive statement both in
the premise and in the conclusion, which is what Hume was really
referring to, that might not be invalid if one can recast “ought”
statements as a particular kind of “is” statement. However, Hume leaves
a lot unsaid.
But here is why: Hume’s argument, though clear on its own terms
is, in fact, very modest. Hume is merely exhorting philosophers to make
their “is” and “ought” statements explicit and to show how they make
31
“[W]hen of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought,
or an ought not.” Id.
32
This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence.
For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or
affirmation, `tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and
at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems
altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction
from others, which are entirely different from it.
Id.
33
But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to
recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small
attention wou’d subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us
see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the
relations of objects, nor is perceiv’d by reason.
Id.
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the transition from an “is” statement to an “ought” conclusion. But he
might believe they cannot and, in all events, puts the burden of proof on
he who would infer norms. That move is far more effective than trying
to determine when and whether normative inferencing is possible.
However, Hume’s modest proposal has been extended well beyond
its own terms.34 Hume has been interpreted to argue that normative
inferencing—deriving “ought” statements—is somehow impossible.35
However, Hume does not make that argument.36 Those who take the
34
See Nicholas Capaldi, Hume’s Rejection of ‘Ought’ as a Moral Category, 63 J. PHIL. 126,
135-36 (1966).
Hume’s statements about moral sentiments are confused with his
statements about moral judgments. It is this confusion which largely
accounts for the misinterpretation of (I-O). That (I-O) is not concerned
with moral judgments but with moral sentiments is best seen in two
ways. First, the entire section deals with a single problem: the attempt
to show that moral distinctions or sentiments are perceived not as
relations of ideas but as impressions. Second, the conclusions of (I-O)
all deal with the analysis of moral distinctions as impressions. Since (IO) concerns moral sentiments and not moral judgments, we may
inquire into the cause of the confusion. At least one reason is that the
paragraph is occasionally read or quoted in an incomplete
manner. . . . Once we accept the view that moral distinctions are
impressions, we must also accept the fact that we can make inferences
about such distinctions and even infer their existence from
accompanying circumstances.
Id.
35
See W. D. Falk, Hume on Is and Ought, in OUGHT, REASONS, AND MORALITY 551 (W.D.
Hudson ed., MacMillan 1969). Hume supposedly
denies the deductibility of the latter from the former, as the ‘ought’
expresses ‘a new relation or affirmation’, ‘entirely different from the
others’. And this is commonly taken as saying that the ought
statement is ‘different’ and non-deducible, because it is no longer a
‘purely factual statement’, to wit one that makes another ordinarily
testable truth claim. However, recent criticism, by W.D. Hudson and
others, points out that Hume says other things seemingly inconsistent
with this. . . . How is one to understand Hume here so as to save him
from incoherence? It is said by Flew that Hume really meant that
moral statements, rather than being about attitudes, serve to express
them. The real Hume was the ancestor of noncognitivism, and the ‘isought’ passage its early charter. By contrast, it is said by MacIntyre
that really Hume did not mean to deny deducibility. When he said
that it ‘seemed inconceivable’, he meant that it only seemed so without
really being so.
Id.
36
See A.C. MacIntyre, “Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought,’ in THE IS-OUGHT QUESTION 485, 493
(W.D. Hudson ed., MacMillan 1969). “Hume in the celebrated passage does not mention
entailment. What he does is to ask how and if moral rules may be inferred from factual
statements, and in the rest of Book II of the Treatise he provides an answer to his own
questions.” Id.
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overly broad interpretation of Hume improperly argue that Hume shows
that normative inferencing is impossible, and if that is so, it is also
impossible to make any “ought” statements at all.37 But this is not
If normative inferencing were impossible, then
Hume’s point.38
prescriptive argumentation would also be impossible.
And, if
prescriptive argumentation were impossible, then everyone would be
relativists, regardless of their subjective opinions about their (supposed)
objectivity. However, the logical conclusion is based on a faulty premise.
Hume does not argue, let alone prove, anything about normative
inferencing. But this misinterpretation of Hume as arguing for an
impossibility of normative inferencing is one of the bases of
contemporary moral relativism.39 Moral relativism as an ideology is a
failure, and its failure helps explain the subsequent failure of the left. 40
Exposing misinterpretations of Hume sets the stage for a correct
reposition of political discourse regarding inalienable human rights back
into the arena of morality and out of the field of alienable economic
goods. By showing that normative inferencing is possible (distributed
prescriptive major premise and conclusion), it becomes possible again to
argue that (1) one ought to oppose killing; (2) the war in Iraq kills; and
(3) thus one ought to oppose the war in Iraq. If one asks why one ought
to do anything, the quick answer is “survival of the species.” That is
materialism—grounding statements not in ideals floating in the air, but
in the facts of the world as it is.

37
See W.D. Hudson, Hume on Is and Ought, in THE IS-OUGHT QUESTION 511 (W.D.
Hudson ed., MacMillan 1969). “Here, as elsewhere in Hume, adumbrations of modern
theory are distorted by his failure to differentiate clearly and explicitly logical from
psychological or sociological issues.” Id.
38
See Falk, supra note 35, at 562. “Hume’s point . . . is not to deny that merit is
cognitively derived from fact; but to make sure that theis derivation is not mistaken for
deduction.” Id.
39
See, e.g., Ethics, THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2006), http://www.iep.
utm.edu/e/ethics.htm.
David Hume argued that moral assessments involve our emotions,
and not our reason. We can amass all the reasons we want, but that
alone will not constitute a moral assessment. We need a distinctly
emotional reaction in order to make a moral pronouncement. Reason
might be of service in giving us the relevant data, but, in Hume’s
words, “reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions.” Inspired
by Hume’s anti-rationalist views, some 20th century philosophers,
most notably A.J. Ayer, similarly denied that moral assessments are
factual descriptions.
Id.
40
See, e.g., Eric Barnes, Supplemental Notes on Relativism, (Sept. 29, 1999), available at
http://138.110.28.9/courses/ebarnes/205/205-sup-relativism.htm.
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Nietzsche is the other principal basis of moral relativism. And, like
Hume, he is misinterpreted often and those misinterpretations paralyze
critical discourse. Nietzsche argues that morality is subjective in that it is
the product of individuals’ choices.41 He rejects Christian morality and
repositions morality by putting it on an individualist and authoritarian
basis.42 Rather than the Christian morality of martyrdom and selfsacrifice, Nietzsche proposes an individualistic morality of egoistic self
aggrandizement.43 Nietzsche is not amoral. Rather, he clearly has a
prescriptive agenda, though his morality is not Christian.
Like Hume, Nietzsche is also often taken too far: Nietzsche might be
some kind of a moral relativist, but his epistemology is not relativist. By
pointing out Nietzsche’s objective epistemology and correctly
understanding his axiology not as nihilism but as egoism, the abuse of
Nietzsche to advance the relativism which sapped the strength of the
Left can be rejected. If epistemology is objective, which is Nietzsche’s
view, then an objective axiology is possible.
By focusing on the bases of moral relativism, this Article will show
how an objective morality is possible and that, by shifting from a failed
relativist world view toward a materialist morality, the Left can regain
those moral cognitivists it has lost to the Right. Likewise, an objective
materialist view of axiology would allow the Left to make prescriptions,
41
See, e.g., Friedrich Nietzche, Götzendämmerung, “Die Verbesserer der Menschheit,”
http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/nietzsch/goetzend/goetze08.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007).
Man kennt meine Forderung an den Philosophen, sich jenseits von Gut
und Böse zu stellen,—die Illusion des moralischen Urtheils unter sich
zu haben. Diese Forderung folgt aus einer Einsicht, die von mir zum
ersten Male formulirt worden ist: dass es gar keine moralischen
Thatsachen giebt. Das moralische Urtheil hat Das mit dem religiösen
gemein, dass es an Realitäten glaubt, die keine sind. Moral ist nur eine
Ausdeutung gewisser Phänomene, bestimmter geredet, eine
Missdeutung. Das moralische Urtheil gehört, wie das religiöse, einer
Stufe der Unwissenheit zu, auf der selbst der Begriff des Realen, die
Unterscheidung des Realen und Imaginären noch fehlt: so dass
“Wahrheit” auf solcher Stufe lauter Dinge bezeichnet, die wir heute
“Einbildungen” nennen. Das moralische Urtheil ist insofern nie
wörtlich zu nehmen: als solches enthält es immer nur Widersinn. Aber
es bleibt als Semiotik unschätzbar: es offenbart, für den Wissenden
wenigstens, die werthvollsten Realitäten von Culturen und
Innerlichkeiten, die nicht genug wussten, um sich selbst zu “verstehn.”
Moral ist bloss Zeichenrede, bloss Symptomatologie: man muss bereits
wissen, worum es sich handelt, um von ihr Nutzen zu ziehen.
Id.
42
Friedrich Nietzche, Beyond Good and Evil, http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/nietzsch/
jenseits/jense002.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007).
43
Id.
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and thus enable it to win arguments that it currently cannot win because
of being trapped within the dead-end that is relativism.
A. Dualism (Plato)
Dualism44 (particularly Manichaeism)45 has marked and marred
Western thought virtually since the beginning of recorded history. The
results of dualism are rather clear: separation (self vs. other), alienation
(employer vs. employee), depression, abuse (parent vs. child), and war
(“my” country vs. “your” country). Plato is perhaps the first recorded
example of dualism in Western philosophy46 and should be contrasted
from pre-Socratics, such as Pythagoras and Heraclites, who were
monists.47
Unfortunately, though Plato’s epistemology is largely
rejected, his ontological dualism is not. Plato distinguishes ideas (eidos)48
from the material (hulé),49 and believes that the idea is somehow prior to
the material in the sense of somehow causing it. For Plato, material
objects are a reflection of ideas,50 and the world is nothing more than a
reflection of the thoughts of God. In modern terms, he is guilty of
magical thinking, he makes a map of reality and then thinks the map is
reality.
Unfortunately for Plato, and fortunately for science, no one has taken
his epistemology very seriously for at least a millennium. One mark of
modernity is the monopoly of empirical materialism on scientific debate.
For modernity, our ideas are a reflection of the material world. But the
rejection of Plato did not have to await industrialization. Even Aristotle

Dualism is the idea that there is a fundamental split between mind and matter.
Manichaeism is the idea that the universe is dualistic and that the duality is marked
by an absolute conflict between polar opposites.
46
The view that there is a separation in the human person between the mind and the
body dates from the history of Western thought to Platonic dualism. Plato’s dualist theory
holds that there are actually two different worlds: the physical world of appearances and
the higher world of intelligible Forms. For Plato, human beings live in a visible world of
the sensible or physical and the invisible world of the intelligible or abstract. This Platonic
dualism was carried forward into a similar separation in the human person between mind
and body. Don G. Rushing & William D. Janicki, Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
Claims Under the Warsaw Convention, 70 J. AIR L. & COM. 429, 430 (2005).
47
Ron Shapira, Structural Flaws of the “Willed Bodily Movement” Theory of Action, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 349, 385 n.121 (1998).
48
Alicia Juarrero-Roque, Fail-Safe Versus Safe-Fail: Suggestions Toward an Evolutionary
Model of Justice, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1748 (1991).
49
Brett G. Scharffs, Law as Craft, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2245, 2267 (2001).
50
Aloysius A. Leopold & Marie E. Kaiser, The Lord in the Law: Reflections on a Catholic
Law School, 25 ST. MARY’S L.J. 385, 389 (1993).
44
45

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/7

Engle: Knight's Gambit to Fool's Mate: Beyond Legal Realism

2007]

Beyond Legal Realism

1645

was skeptical about Platonic formalism.51 Similarly, Descartes52 and
Pascal,53 although themselves dualists,54 did not attempt to defend
platonic idealism, despite the solipsistic55 skepticism of Descartes that
could admit Plato’s purely noëtic world.56 In fact, Aquinas seems to be
the most recent person to have taken platonic idealism seriously.57
In law, platonism plays out as formalism: to see the law in rigid
terms of eternal and unchanging forms of action, which themselves are
reflections of logical structure. Plato was wrong: reality is not the
reflection of ideas; ideas are a reflection of reality. However, attempts to
oppose formalism with relativism have not only failed, they have
backfired because, though Plato was wrong, Cicero was right—law is
right reasoning in accord with nature58—and consequently Holmes was
wrong59—the life of law is logic in action; it is phroenesis,60 the practical
51
ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS bk. I, pt. 9 (W.D. Ross trans., Clarendon Press 1924) (350
B.C.E.), available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/metaphysics.mb.txt; see also
ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS bk. B, pt. 3, l.10 (Hippocrates G. Apostle trans., 1981);
ARISTOTLE, PRIOR ANALYTICS bk. A, pt. 31 (Robin Smith trans., 1989).
52
RENE DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY (1641), available at
http://oregonstate.edu/instruct/phl302/texts/descartes/meditations/meditations.html.
53
Pascal, for example, specifically declines any attempt to prove the existence of “God”
that is a nöous. “Therefore I shall not undertake here to prove by natural reasons either the
existence of God, or the Trinity, or the immortality of the soul, or anything of that
nature . . . .” BLAISE PASCAL, PENSÉES § VIII (1660), available at http://www.textfiles.com/
etext/NONFICTION/pascal-pensees-569.txt.
54
See generally id.
55
Solipsism is the philosophical theory that the self is the only thing that can be known
and verified. See DESCARTES, supra note 52 (English); id., available at http://abu.cnam.fr/
cgi-bin/go?medit3 (French).
56
See Philippe Nonet, In Praise of Callicles, 74 IOWA L. REV. 807, 808 (1989).
The Republic restates the same thought in the form of the distinction
between two realms: that of the noëton, accessible to reason, nous, and
of which knowledge, noësis, is possible; and that of the horaton, visible
to the eyes, and about which there can be only doxa, what seems, mere
opinion.
Id.
57
See, e.g., ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA (Fathers of the English Dominican
Province trans., 1947).
58
“[E]st quidem vera lex recta ratio, naturae congruens, diffusa in omnis, constans,
sempiterna, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, vetando a fraude deterreat . . . [H]uic legi nec
obrogari fas est, neque derogari aliquid ex hac licet, neque tota abrogari potest . . . .”
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE REPUBLICA: SCRIPTA QUAE MANSERUNT OMNIA 96, bk. III, pt.
22, § 33, ll. 26-32 (K. Ziegler ed., Leipzig 1969) (Bibliotheca Teubneriana fasc. 39).
59
Holmes argues for a pre-scientific view of law:
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The felt
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more
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reasoning that looks at the world as it is and attempts to shape the world
as it ought to be. Holmes did not realize that he was trying to describe
phroenesis because his ideas were influenced by Hume61 rather than
Aristotle, and Hume is interpreted as rejecting the possibility of practical
reasoning because he (supposedly) does not see that moral prescriptions
can be based on material analysis.62
One can infer from all this that Platonic idealism is indefensible. It
has been quietly abandoned and replaced—first by materialism, then by
skepticism, and now, perhaps, by relativism. Both relativism63 and
Platonic idealism64 are unscientific because they lack an empirical
foundation, which is definitive of science.65 The material world is
radically separated from and anterior to the world of ideas (Plato), or
relativised (post-modernism),66 and so no scientific verification of their
propositions is possible.

to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should
be governed.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881). A simple reductio meets the
argument. If syllogisms are irrelevant why bother thinking? Why not just break out the
billy clubs? If law is nothing but passion and prejudice, then law has no moral force and I
might as well go be a criminal. Of course, if one were a criminal one would have a bad life
and society would be worse off. Actions follow ideas. Moreover, if we look at the law, we
see it is more than physical force it is also moral constraint. Holmes’ view is amoral, but
the province of law is morality. See Id.
60
Scharffs, supra note 49, at 2265-66.
61
Holmes and Hume alike embrace Western values but question their ultimate
foundation. Rob Atkinson, Law as a Learned Profession: The Forgotten Mission Field of the
Professionalism Movement, 52 S.C. L. REV. 621, 653 (2001).
62
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, supra note 29, at 416. It is not “contrary to
reason to prefer even my own acknowleg’d lesser good to my greater . . . .” Id.
63
Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1203 n.98
(2001).
64
“[S]ome form of mind-body dualism has been part of Western philosophy since
Plato . . . .” Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 405, 411 (1995).
65
J.B. Ruhl, The Battle over Endangered Species Act Methodology, 34 ENVTL. L. 555, 564
(2004). “Scientific Method . . . is defined by the use of empirical observation and
experimental testing to formulate and evaluate hypotheses, usually about causal
mechanisms, with which to predict . . . .” Id.
66
Some even try to combine relativism with dualism. For example, Radbruch
combines relativism with neo-Kantian methodological dualism:
statements of what the law ought to be may be established only
through other statements concerning the “ought,” never through what
the law “is.” “Ought” statements may not be “discerned but only
professed.” Therefore, legal science in the field of the “ought” can
achieve three things: (1) “establish the means necessary to realize the
end that ought to be attained,” (2) “think a legal value judgment
through down to the remotest means for its realization,
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B. Relativism
The task of epistemology is to determine “what is knowledge.”67
Post-modern thought often presents relativism as though it were
something new, a radical reaction to the violence and cynicism of two
world wars. In fact, however, truth skepticism is nothing new. Even
among pre-modern philosophers—notably the cynics, but also the
sophists generally—truth skepticism, even nihilism, could be found.
More recently, the roots of (post-)modern relativism are generally
ascribed, with some degree of justice and distortion, to Hume68 and
Nietzsche.69 The post-modernists are riding the crest of a wave of
skepticism, which has indeed grown due to the failure of the nation-state
system to preserve peace in the last century. However, post-modernism
as a system of thought is neither particularly new nor correct.
1.

Nietzsche

Nietzsche is probably the most well-known modern example of
skepticism towards received truth.70 The idea of progress is a central
[and] . . . clarify it up to its ultimate presuppositions of world outlook,”
and (3) develop systematically the “conceivable ultimate
presuppositions and, consequently, all starting points of legal
evaluation.” Radbruch presents a relativistic legal philosophy that
exhaustively presents the individual with all possibilities from which
only he or she can decide.
Heather Leawoods, Gustav Radbruch: An Extraordinary Legal Philosopher, 2 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 489, 509-10 (2000). But where is the law in that? Law is nothing other than ought
statements. You ought not to steal (or you will go to jail). In fact, any “ought” statement
can be recast into a conditional (“if . . . then”) statement. Thus, “you ought not to steal”
really means: “If you steal then you may go to jail.” Seeing the world only in terms of
descriptions of existing facts or prescriptions of possible states is a static view. A dynamic
world view takes into account state-changes. The world is not only about static facts (“is”
statements); it is also about dynamic processes (conditionals). If any ought statement can
be recast as a conditional, then Hume’s (supposed) dichotomy breaks down completely.
67
“Epistemology is the philosophical study of what is ‘knowledge’ (what it is to know)
and how do we come to know (when do we have ‘knowledge’).” Scott DeVito, The
Ontology of Copyright Infringement: Puzzles, Parts, and Pieces, 35 CONN. L. REV. 817, 817 n.3
(2003).
68
“Hume’s scheme jeopardizes the intersubjective ascribability of merit. One might no
longer be allowed to ask whether tolerance is good, only whether it is good with me or
with you; or, worse still, with me or you now . . . .” Falk, supra note 35, at 123, 138.
69
See, e.g., FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL (Helen Zimmern
trans., 1997), available at http://digital.library.upenn.edu/webbin/gutbook/lookup?num=
4363 (Project Gutenberg).
70
James A. Gardner, Madison’s Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of Electoral
Systems, 86 IOWA L. REV. 87, 171 (2000). “During the nineteenth century, skepticism toward
the Enlightenment concept of objective truth appeared everywhere, from Bentham’s
dismissal of natural law as ‘nonsense on stilts’ to Neitzsche’s antifoundationalism.” Id.
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defining point of both modernity71 and Nietzsche’s work. Thus,
Nietzsche is not a post-modernist: he is part of the discourse of
modernity because he believes in progress and makes proposals on how
to obtain it. The objective of Nietzsche’s work is the conscious evolution
of the human species. However, unlike his contemporary and fellow
modernist Karl Marx,72 who sees the progress of the species as driving
towards new and better modes of production throughout history,
Nietzsche defines progress as the ability of the species to genetically
surpass itself via Darwinian evolution.73 Both are modernists, scientists,
and materialists, but they take different perspectives on progress.
Much of what Nietzsche says appears on first glance to be postmodernist.74 He is certainly skeptical about the truth. However,
71
Tawia Ansah, A Terrible Purity: International Law, Morality, Religion, Exclusion, 38
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 9, 64, (2005).
72
See KARL MARX, CAPITAL (Frederick Engels ed., 1936).
73
See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA (Thomas Common trans., 1960)
[hereinafter NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA].
74
Many mistake Nietzsche for a postmodernist. E.g., Barbara Stark, International Human
Rights Law, Feminist Jurisprudence, and Nietzsche’s “Eternal Return”: Turning the Wheel, 19
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 169, 182 n.68 (1996). Nietzsche’s commitment to objective truth and
progress place him firmly in the modernist camp. Even those who recognize some
problems between Nietzsche and postmodernism fail to recognize just how deep the split
is. For example,
Postmodern thinkers generally trace their intellectual debts back to
Nietzsche, but Nietzsche stands diametrically opposed to the
caricature of a postmodern thinker who is paralyzed by the collapse of
metaphysics and therefore incapable of critical theorizing.
Consequently, Gadamer’s arguments against Habermas’s critical
theory do not carry much force in response to Nietzschean critique.
My thesis is that by understanding how Nietzsche can at once be a
critical theorist and a postmodern critic of the metaphysical tradition,
we can develop an important resource for articulating the role of
critical theory within Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics.
Francis J. Mootz III, Nietzschean Critique and Philosophical Hermeneutics, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.
967, 971 (2003). The ignorance continues: “Friedrich Nietzsche, who has been called the
‘patron saint of [P]ostmodern philosophy,’ proclaimed the death of God in what amounted
to a rejection of Modern thought, primarily a rejection of the idea of a ‘unifying center.’”
Matthew McNeil, The First Amendment out on Highway 61: Bob Dylan, RLUIPA, and the
Problem with Emerging Postmodern Religion Clauses Jurisprudence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1021, 104041 (2004). Wrong again. First, the mixed metaphor of a patron saint of a godless religion is
inapt. Nietzsche is not looking to build a church filled with what he and Jesus both
regarded as sheep. He is seeking wolves to go hunting with. Second, and more
importantly, Nietzsche does not reject modernity. Rather, he seeks to advance modernity
to the next stage in its evolution. A rejection of pre-scientific superstition is a part of
modernity’s belief in Vorsprung durch Technik—progress through technology. Nietzsche
may be a forerunner of postmodernism but is no post-modern. After all truth skepticism
goes back all the way to William of Occam. So calling Nietzsche postmodern on that basis
would justify calling the pre-modern Occam postmodernist.
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Nietzsche’s mocking skepticism of the received wisdom, as a product of
rote repetition of those in power, does not mean he rejects the possibility
of the existence of truth. Nietzsche is no nihilist; in fact, he was
passionate about truth. For Nietzsche, if truth can exist and is knowable,
then, once determined, he would defend it with the Wagnerian ardor of
Gotterdämerung: “the absolute truth—against itself.”75 It is exactly the
love of truth that pushed Nietzsche to ask the question, “what is truth?”
Aristotle describes virtue generally as the median between equally
opposite and destructive antitheses.76 For example, Aristotle regards the
virtue of prudence as a median between the extremes of rashness and
cowardice.77 Though Aristotle counsels prudence, Nietzsche counsels
the exact opposite. Nietzsche’s Hyperborean is a man of extremes.
Nietzsche once said, “I am not a man; I am Dynamite.”78 Like
Heraclites,79 (who also influenced Marx on this point), Nietzsche believes
that truth results from conflict. Thus, though skeptical about existing
“truths,” Nietzsche believes the truth could exist and, if it does, is worth
fighting for. Some post-modernists, with their rejection of universal
absolutes and ideology, go beyond Nietzsche: they do not argue for the
clash of the absolute “truth” against itself.80 Ultimately, they argue that
FRIEDRICH WILHELM NIETZSCHE, GÖTZEN-DÄMMERUNG bk. 5 (1888), available at
http://www.gutenberg2000.de//nietzsch/goetzend/goetze05.htm.
76
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 44-48, bk. 2, ch. 7 (Martin Ostwald trans., 1962).
77
Thomas L. Shaffer & Mary M. Shaffer, Character and Community: Rispetto as a Virtue in
the Tradition of Italian-American Lawyers, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 838 (1989).
78
“Ich bin kein Mensch, ich bin Dynamit.” FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, WARUM ICH EIN
SCHICKSAL BIN 1 (1889).
79
HERACLITES, THE FRAGMENTS (b), 8 (c. 500 B.C.), available at http://ratmachines.com/
philosophy/heraclites/.
80
“‘The elevation of rationalism to a position of ultimate authority has created an
intolerance for ambiguity and subjective beliefs.’” Erin Englebrecht, Three Fallacies of the
Contemporary Legal Concept of Environmental Injury: An Appeal To Enhance “One-Eyed Reason”
with a Normative Consciousness, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 38 (2004).
In short, the emergence of moral relativism in Western thought, in
which it is believed that there are no objective truths and that morals
are relative and subjective, has led contemporary legal theories to
reject natural law and other normative concepts. Alexander offers the
possibility, however, that it is really the limits of human rationality,
and not the limits of morality, that prevent us from perceiving
ultimate, substantive truths. Alexander contends that by adopting an
epistemology aware of human limitation, contemporary jurisprudence
would not develop narrow and short-sighted answers to dilemmas
that are inherently not objective, not quantifiable, and not concrete.
Instead, a humbled epistemology demands a jurisprudence that seeks
the assistance of disciplines other than economics and science such as
theology and moral philosophy.
Id.
75
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truth is relative to subjective standards.81 However, that proposition
eventually collapses into the conclusion that there can be no objective
universal truth, and thus there can be no science (episteme), but rather
only opinion (doxa). This failure of moral vision, resulting from an
erroneous axiology, is exactly what has crippled the Left in the United
States.
At first glance, the post-modern argument that “all truth is relative”
might seem unproblematic. However, with reflection, it becomes clear
that saying “all truth is relative” is equivalent to saying “there is no
objective truth.” The relativist statement in fact creates a paradox. That
fact should tip us off that something may be wrong in the world of
relativism. This Article refers to this as the paradox of the “unknowing
knower”: if truth does not exist, then how can we know that truth does
not exist? Logically speaking, we cannot. In this way, relativism leads
us to truth nihilism. And truth nihilism, in turn, either disintegrates on
the paradox or degenerates into a pure volonté de puissance82 (i.e., brute
force). Relativist thought thus risks degeneration into fascism—if truth
is unknowable and moral values relative, then only force exists. And if
force is the only real argument, then why not be fascist?83 This paradox
plagues post-modern thought and dooms it to irrelevance—or worse.
This also explains why the relativist position must be rejected. Its
foundational presumptions are wrong, and it leads us nowhere we want
to go.
The relativist position is thus easily dispatched by either the paradox
of the unknowing knower or the reductio ad absurdum that truth nihilism
and moral relativism can eventually result in fascism. There are,
however, better positions of truth skepticism. Some, such as Nietzsche’s,
rise to the level of brilliance.84 However, most of them will also fail—
81
Steven Best & Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations (1991),
http://www.uta.edu/huma/pomo_theory/.
82
“Will to power.”
83
That point also constitutes a general critique of legal positivism. However, naturalist
theories of law cannot offer an alternative to legal positivism because they rely at least
implicitly (in the case of Aquinas explicitly) on Platonic idealism. This Article suggests that
any alternative to purely voluntarist theories of law must be founded on an ontology which
rejects Hume’s dualism just as it must also be founded on an epistemology which rejects
Plato’s dualism.
84
In fact, Nietzsche believed that truth, if it exists, is only discovered through the battle
to the death with its opposite. For Nietzsche, truth must fight to live: this is his will to
truth; not the will to shape “truth” out of falsehood, but the will to the battle of truth
against falsehood. In this, Nietzsche, like Marx (e.g., KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS,
MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY (1848), available at http://www.hartfordhwp.com/archives/26/176.html), harkens back to Heraclites (HERACLITES, supra note 79, at
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albeit not so quickly or nicely as truth nihilism. In its more refined form,
the truth skeptic’s argument against the existence of truth is really only
an argument against the ability to cognize truth. The truth skeptic
argues that truth may (or may not) exist, but even if truth did exist it
may not be cognized (i.e., known, as such). The “strong” version of this
argument, that truth does not exist, has already been shown to be
flawed. This weaker version, that the truth is unknowable, leads to the
same conclusion—that science would be impossible. It seems almost as
untenable by reductio. But what about truth skepticism? What happens
if only some truths are unknowable? Namely, what if we accept the
validity of our sense impressions and use our perceptions of reality as
the basis for objective descriptions of reality? Then some truths would
be knowable—particularly, truths about material facts—and we would
be out of the dark (relativism) and back into science. That is Nietzsche’s
position—at least some truths are knowable.
Thus, Nietzsche is faithful to the idea of truth because he rejects
intersubjectivity.85 Truth may or may not always be knowable, but at
least sometimes it is, and thus science is possible. Nietzsche is willing to
entertain the possibility that truth, or at least some of the truth, could be
generally incapable of cognition (i.e., formal demonstration). Basically,
he admits we might all be staggering around in the dark, and that might
be inalterable, but he clearly hopes otherwise. If no truth at all were
possible, we would not and could not know it. For this reason, our praxis
must presume that truth is possible and then fight for it.
Precisely because Nietzsche defends truth, he accepts that we should
live in a world of skepticism because it is possible that the truth value of
some statements may be unknowable (which is a different proposition
than that there is no truth). Misapprehension of this fine distinction is
one reason why post-modernism presents untenable positions. It
overstates truth skepticism and elevates it to intersubjective relativism or
nihilism. Understanding these errors makes it easier to reject them.
Rejecting relativism makes it possible to argue from a moral viewpoint
against economic values as the standard par excellence of political
discourse.
But while Nietzsche admits it is possible that we cannot know the
truth about all objects, he believes that, if only for the practical reason
stated, it is possible to know the truth about some objects. Just as
(b)). See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, MENSCHLICHES, ALLZUMENSCHLICHES (erster Hauptstück)
(1878).
85
See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, DIE FRÖHLICHE WISSENSCHAFT (1882).
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Nietzsche recognizes the existence of darkness (ignorance) in the
Platonic cave86 (the material world, specifically The City),87 and points
out the possible existence of false illumination (the central fire),88 he also
admits the Apollonian possibility (but not the necessity) that there might
be the true light of reason89 (the sun in Zarathustra) and that the only
way to find the light is to ruthlessly question its existence (because of the
false light). It is this sort of a critical attitude that is needed to pose the
questions and find the answers needed to remedy the breakdown of
American political discourse and its resulting incoherent foreign policy.
The apotheosis of Nietzsche is cognition of his own ignorance: he
knows he does not know. He has knowledge of his ignorance. That is,
proverbially, wisdom.90 All philosophy may or may not begin in
wonder.91 But all truth begins, often painfully, in the cognition of our
See NIETZSCHE, The Sign, in THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 73, at 365, ch. 80.
Nietzsche describes his higher men—the next evolutionary stage in human development—
as living in a cave:
In the morning after this night however Zarathustra sprang up from
his camp, girded his loins, and came out of his CAVE glowing and
strong, like the dawn’s SUN which comes out from behind dark
mountains. You giant star’, he spoke, as he had first spoken ‘you deep
eye of luck and joy, what would be your joy and happiness if you did
not have they whom you enlighten!/And if they remain in their
chambers while you are already awake and come to give and share how would your pride be upbraided!/Well! They still sleep these
higher men, while I am awake. They are not my true comrades. I do
not await them here in my mountains!/I want to go to my work, to my
day: but they do not understand what the signs of my morning are, my
step is for them no wake up call./They still sleep in my cave . . . .
Id.
87
Id. at Zarathustra’s Prologue (especially pt.3: “The Rope Dancer”).
88
PLATO, The Allegory of the Cave, in THE REPUBLIC bk. VII (360 B.C.E.), available at
http://www.constitution.org/pla/republic.htm. “This wanderer is no stranger to me:
many years ago he went by here. He is called Zarathustra; but he has changed. Then you
carried your ASHES to the mountains: do you want to carry FIRE to the valleys? Do you
not fear the arsonist’s punishment?” Id.; see NIETZSCHE, Zarathustra’s Prologue, in THUS
SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 73 (author’s translation). Like Prometheus, Zarathustra
brings men fire, yet he brings not the truth of reason (the sun) but the stolen Promethean
fire. Is it a lie?
89
He does this in his metaphor about the sun.
90
He who knows not and knows not that he knows not, is a fool . . . shun
him.
He who knows not and knows that he knows not, is
ignorant . . . teach him. He who knows and knows not that he knows,
is asleep . . . wake him. He who knows and knows that he knows, is a
wise man . . . follow him.
Knows and Knows, http://www.xenodochy.org/ex/quotes/knowsnot.html (last visited Jan.
27, 2007) (Persian proverb).
91
PLATO, THEAETETUS (360 B.C.E.), available at http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/theatu.
html (citing Socrates).
86
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own ignorance. Nietzsche’s entire work is defined around his reaction to
his own ignorance. Americans are ignorant of foreign languages,92
geography, histories, religions, and cultures.93 One can rightly ask: Are
American’s deliberately kept ignorant of foreign cultures and languages
to make them more manipulable? Whether the ignorance is calculated or
merely the result of physical isolation from the rest of the world,
Americans can no longer afford the luxury of monolingualism and
Amero-centrism. Only if Americans become conscious of their ignorance
and take steps to cure it can they avoid the pain their ignorance causes.
Americans do not know and think they know.94
They approach a vast complex world with simplistic universalist
ideals, which are generally perverted and cynically used to advance a
corporatist agenda. Worse, the occasional Left attempt to thwart the
corporatist agenda is crippled by relativism, which is also an example of
knowing not that one knows not. Correcting the flawed relativism
would empower efforts to oppose corporatism. Understanding the
complexities of the world is a necessary first step to avoid “living in a
glass towers and throwing stones.” But an entire reconceptualization not
only of history and geography and language, but also the proper role of
America in the world and of moral choice is necessary to stop the stone
throwing and the counter-stone throwing.
In Thus Spake Zarathustra, we see Nietzsche, as Zarathustra, reject
society and the crowd (i.e., The City, to seek the “all seeing eye”—the
sun, representing Apollonian truth).95
However, even after this
illumination, when he returns to The City he discovers he is still
ignorant. For why else would the crowd reject him? Why else would
the risk-takers and rope-dancers—the innovative catalysts of progress,
92
“I spoke in English, but no one minded that. Everyone expects Americans to be ignorant
of any foreign language.” Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitution-Building in the Former Soviet Union,
GREEN BAG, 1998, at 168 (emphasis added).
93
“[P]opular American culture reflects broad ignorance of overseas events and foreign
affairs.” Raymond M. Brown, I Into Thou: American Resistance to Narratives of International
Humanitarian Law Violations, 28 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 5 (2005).
94
Andrew Sagartz, Resolution of International Commercial Disputes: Surmounting Barriers of
Culture Without Going to Court, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 675, 683 n.42 (1998).
Americans have neither the tradition nor the necessity of living
internationally. Their ignorance about foreign countries, cultures and
customs, their lack of linguistic abilities, and their inability to always
respect foreign sensitivities are entirely understandable. . . . [Others]
take offense [however] when . . . American ignorance goes arm-in-arm
with American arrogance.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
95
NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 73.
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his Heroes, forerunners of the next Man—plummet to their death? Only
Nietzsche’s/Zarathustra’s ignorance of the limitations of homo sapiens
could explain the masses’ rejection of enlightenment. Though Nietzsche
is rejected by the masses, he does not himself reject logical scientific
truth. Rather, he believes that he has perceived an uncomfortable
objective truth—that humanity, as it is, is not capable of perceiving or
accepting all of the truth.
This is also the conclusion of Leo Strauss96 and Machiavelli.97
However, Nietzsche does not share another conclusion of Strauss and
Machiavelli—that one should be economical with the truth and use it
sparingly for tactical advantages. Instead, Nietzsche takes a radical
strategy that, if correct, perhaps outmaneuvers Marx: if humanity as it
exists on the whole is beneath the standard of rationality, risk-taking,
and facing hard truths, then humanity must evolve beyond itself.98
Nietzsche’s objective is no less than to push the human species into the
next phase of its upward evolutionary spiral.99 Marx seeks to advance
the human species as a collective methodically through technological
progress. Nietzsche, in contrast, seeks out individuals who are “higher
types,” precursors of the next strain of homo, to determine how to
cultivate such exceptions to mediocrity so that their numbers will grow.
Like Marx, he is trying to push the society forward following the logic of
modernity, “progress,” but in a very different way. Such projects,
however, are impossible without scientific truth.
Both strategies simply outmaneuver dishonest tacticians like Leo
Strauss or Machiavelli, who are playing for much lower stakes and are
strategically blinded because of their tactical choice to deploy
dishonesty. It is this sort of tactical “shrewdness” that leads the Left to
wrongly reject moral discourse. Hoping to outmaneuver conservative
moralists, most of the Left has abandoned the idea of morality. That,
96
“Strauss believed that the essential truths about human society and history should be
held by an elite, and [h]e held that philosophy is dangerous because it brings into question
the conventions on which civil order and the morality of society depend.” R. Alta Charo,
Passing on the Right: Conservative Bioethics Is Closer than It Appears, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 307,
311 (2004).
97
NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES 139, 143 (Bernard R. Crick ed. & Leslie J.
Walker trans., Penguin 1970) (1520). Machiavelli, like Plato, counseled religious hypocrisy.
Id.
98
NIETZSCHE, THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 73, at sec. 3, available at
http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/nietzsch/zara/als2003.htm. “Ich lehre euch den Übermenschen.
Der Mensch ist Etwas, das überwunden werden soll.” Id.
99
NIETZSCHE, On the Higher Men, in THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 73, at bk. IV,
sec. 3. “Zarathustra aber fragt als der Einzige und Erste: ``wie wird der Mensch
überwunden?’“ Id.
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however, shifts all debates to economic values where the Left is doomed
to lose because any redistributive agenda entails transaction costs and
thus is uneconomical: slavery is profitable. By tactically sacrificing the
idea of morality in vain hopes of evading conservative moralists, the Left
commits a grave strategic error because the debates are then shifted out
of the sphere of morality (where persons have inalienable value) to the
sphere of the market where all is bought and sold according to the logic
of profit. However, the worst excesses of that can be avoided with a
correct appreciation of Nietzsche. Nietzsche is not a nihilist; he is not
even a relativist. Rather, Nietzsche is a moralist, but his morality is antiChristian. A correct appreciation of Nietzsche’s contribution to a
scientific understanding of morality would allow the Left to diminish,
and even escape, its strategic error (the fool’s mate) at the hands of
economists, gained for a tactical advantage over the conservative
moralists (the knight’s gambit).
In sum, Nietzsche, though cryptic, is no liar. He is a truth skeptic
and is ultimately a scientist. His scientificity comes through most clearly
in Die Fröhliche Wissenschaft (cognitively, The Frolicking Science, eulogos—in some sense a eulogy for Ignorance).100 He believes in truth.
But his faith in truth is not the blind faith of religion: his faith in truth is
founded on a skeptical experiential inquiry guided by a teleology only
dimly perceived by most—a conscious effort to force the evolution of the
human species. Post-modernists who see Nietzsche as their role model
simply do not know what modernity is or what Nietzsche was saying
about progress, truth, and science.
2.

Gödel, Quine, Saussure

Roots of post-modernism and relativism have been seen in
Nietzsche, and the reason for their misapprehension has been explained.
Nietzsche is not the only source of confusion among post-modernists
and other relativists. The most defensible position that seems relativist is
the cognitive skeptic’s argument that we should distrust what we are
told is truth and that truth may not always be knowable. Other
defensible roots of indefensible positions can be seen in the works of
Kurt Gödel, Willard Quine, and Ferdinand de Saussure.
Gödel’s famous theorem, that in a closed formal system all true
theorems cannot be proven and all false theorems cannot be disproven,
supports the cognitive skeptic’s argument that truth cannot always be
100

NIETZSCHE, DIE FRÖHLICHE WISSENSCHAFT, supra note 85.
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known.101 When understood, Gödel’s complex idea is a powerful one,
but does not compel relativism in any way. Similarly, Saussure argues
that the sign is an arbitrary value:102 for Saussure, there is no underlying
universal root language common to all world languages.103 Willard
Quine argues that language is inevitably indeterminate as every term is
mutually defined.104 Ultimately, the sign is arbitrary—anything can
stand for anything else.105
How correct is relativist epistemology? Though signs are mutually
defined, they are not exclusively so defined. The sign is not completely
arbitrary because certain signs are reflections of material facts and
because some words are indeed onomatopoetic. Linguistic determinacy
is secured by anchoring signs in material objects. Representations of
Quine that argue that his work implies that legal discourse be
indeterminate because all argument is ultimately tautological miss the
point and take Quine too far. All argument is ultimately founded on
axioms and postulates, and thus is ultimately tautological. However,
maneuvering from axioms and postulates to theorems must nonetheless
result from internally consistent rule generation methods, which may be
valid or invalid. Their validity is a reflection of material facts and
material processes. Law is like a formal system, an abstract game with
rules of production, axioms, postulates, and theorems.
Truth skepticism—unlike nihilism or relativism—is defensible.
Language may (or may not) be an intersubjective construct. However,
language is only indeterminate when we engage in the dualist error of
seeing language as pure idea with no connection to the material objects
that it describes and reflects. Most of the flaws in Western theory arise
out of dualism.106 If the Left were to reject dualism, numerous
dependant issues would fall into place. But so long as the Left follows
dualism, it will be presented with blind alleys and rabbit trails.
101
K. Gödel: Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter
Systeme, I. MONATSHEFTE FÜR MATHEMATIK UND PHYSIK 38, 173-98 (1931), translated in van
Heijenoort: From Frege to Gödel (Harvard Univ. Press 1971), available at
http://home.ddc.net/ygg/etext/godel/.
102
See FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, THIRD COURSE OF LECTURES ON GENERAL LINGUISTICS
(1910), available at http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/fr/
saussure.htm.
103
See id.
104
W. V. O. QUINE, WORDS AND OBJECTS (1960).
105
PETER BICHSEL, “Ein Tisch ist ein Tisch,” in KINDERGESCHICHTEN (Berlin und Neuwied
1969).
106
Dualism is a flawed theory. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 597, 612 n.42 (2001); Richard Hyland, The Spinozist, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 805, 822 (1992).
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However, a monist-materialist perspective allows us to escape from
the problem of linguistic indeterminacy as the sign, even if syntactically
arbitrary, is not semantically arbitrary because the sign is a reflection of a
material object. As the syntax of the sign is intersubjective and its object
is objective, signs are determinate functions.
Language is not
semantically arbitrary because objective knowledge exists. Additionally,
because objective knowledge exists, knowledge, whether an objective
morality, exists and the content of that morality is possible. Again,
resituating the Left’s discourse in moral terms allows the Left to obtain
the long absent traction needed to advance its arguments.
As this Article will show, the axiology that flows from dualism and
relativism is fundamentally flawed. That flawed axiology, when
consciously rejected, allows the Left to argue coherently for moral
positions. Whenever the Left has taken up the failed relativist axiology to
oppose conservative moralism, it has lost. It has neither changed the
mind of the conservative moralists nor implemented its alternative
vision of reality. Instead, it has undercut its own moral force. The Left,
by taking up the failed relativist axiology has tried to develop and
implement legal methods that distort discourse and mute critique of the
dominant paradigm in the legal and political arena. Taking up the failed
relativist axiology prevents effective legal reform. This failed axiology
leads to incoherent political positions and incoherence in contemporary
political discourse. Understanding the source of these distortions is the
first step in ending them. Ending the distorted and incoherent legal and
political debates by taking up a correct monist and materialist axiology is
a necessary step to rectifying injustice.
C. Constructivism: Popper
We have already seen that, for Plato, our ideas construct the
universe. Constructivism argues that knowledge is not discovered;
rather, it is created socially, and thus is constructed. For example,
Saussure is a constructivist.107
Truth is not objective for the
constructivist, rather it is intersubjective. However, the constructivist
position runs into the same obstacles as relativism. Some facts clearly
are not socially constructed.
Similar to constructivism, and another possible root of relativism, is
the falsification thesis of Popper. For Popper, like Nietzsche, all

107

SAUSSURE, supra note 102.
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knowledge is tentative.108 However, Popper also argues that science is
not the discovery or affirmation of positions, but rather the falsification
and rejection of competing theories.109 For Popper, it is not that we know
that P is true, but rather that we know that not P is false.110 Again, this is
similar to Nietzsche because it implies a sort of epistemological
Darwinism, where easily falsified ideas fail quickly and less easily
falsified ones continue to exist until finally disproved, but the surviving
ideas are still subject to the possibility of falsification. Popper’s position
is quite defensible, and it is an example of what might appear to be
relativism, yet is in fact good science.111 Essentially, Popper is arguing
that knowledge is tentative and refutable, which is a position of classic
modern science since Francis Bacon.112 But when we see that skepticism
is a root belief of the scientific method that leads us to a paradox, which
might please Marx, the scientific method sows the seeds of its own
destruction.113 The skepticism of the scientific method has prepared the
ground for the intersubjectivist thesis that knowledge is socially
constructed out of subjective experience. But that, if true, would imply
the impossibility of objective knowledge and of science.
D. Intersubjectivism
According to relativists, all knowledge is subjective and socially
constructed into an intersubjective reality, except for the knowledge that
knowledge is relative and intersubjective. Thus, intersubjectivism leads
us to nothing other than a slightly more elaborate variant of the paradox
of the unknowing knower. This regress into paradox can be avoided
KARL R. POPPER, The Problem of Induction, in POPPER SELECTIONS 101, 104 (David Miller
ed., 1985). “[T]he whole apparatus of induction becomes unnecessary once we admit the
general fallibility of human knowledge, . . . the conjectural character of human
knowledge. . . . [S]cientific knowledge is essentially conjectural or hypothetical.” Id.
109
KARL POPPER, OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE (1972).
110
Popper’s famous explanatory example is rendered thus by Bryan
Magee, “although no number of observation statements reporting
observations of white swans allow us logically to derive the universal
statement ‘All swans are white’, one single observation statement,
reporting one single observation of a black swan, allows us logically to
derive the statement ‘Not all swans are white.’”
Laurie W.H. Ackermann, Constitutional Comparativism in South Africa: A Response to Sir Basil
Markesinis and Jörg Fedtke, 80 TUL. L. REV. 169, 184 (2005).
111
See, e.g., Karl Popper, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2006), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/.
112
FRANCIS BACON, THE NEW ORGANON OR TRUE DIRECTIONS CONCERNING THE
INTERPRETATION OF NATURE ch. LXX (1620), available at http://www.constitution.org/
bacon/nov_org.htm.
113
See also Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Manifesto of the Communist Party, reprinted in
COMMUNISM, FASCISM, AND DEMOCRACY 82-89 (Carl Cohen ed., 2d ed. 1972).
108
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only if one admits the possibility of the objective knowledge of the
subjectivity of knowledge. But if we admit that there is an objective
epistemology, then why should objectivity be limited to epistemology?
If epistemology can be objective, then why could an objective moral
science or physical science not also be possible? So the regress, if denied
by that step, lets us get back into an objective view of the world. And the
material facts of the objective world contradict the constructivist and
relativist position. It is an objective fact that water always boils at a
certain temperature, regardless what we think or say about it. Thus, an
unqualified non-cognitivist stance can be cogently defended, if at all,
only with great difficulty, namely by admitting a position that sneaks
objectivity into the supposedly intersubjective universe through the back
door.
Why defend these awkward positions? Awkward positions such as
these are the result of the sort of tactical gambits of the realists and the
truth economies recommended by Strauss and Machiavelli. In this case,
the supposed Left wing gambit, namely masking a Leftist morality in the
guise of moral relativism or scientific neutrality after Weber (sometimes
even relying on a radical individualist libertarian argument which is
another strategic error) backfires—which would probably delight
Strauss—and hopefully demonstrates the danger of using the truth
sparingly.
The Left critique of morality attempts to undermine moral values
with which the Left disagrees, usually in an attempt to liberate the
subject from power.114 This explains why radical individualism and/or
libertarian arguments are sometimes made in bad defenses of Left wing
agendas. Those arguments ultimately backfire, however, because
capitalism is individualistic and based on money. This is not the only
way that supposed radicals, by taking opportunistic gambits, err.
Undermining moral values elevates market values115 as the only
objective scientific value. As most money is controlled by men,
undermining moral values leads to elevating market values, which, in
turn, leads to augmenting the power of men.116 Thus, the pseudo-Left
gambit reinforces patriarchy and reiterates the hierarchy of the rich as
114
On the liberation of the subject from power see, e,g., Eric Engle, The Torture Victim’s
Protection Act, the Alien Tort Claims Act and Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge, 67 ALB. L.
REV. 501 (2003), or anything by Foucault.
115
Robert F. Blomquist, Re-Enchanting Torts, 56 S.C. L. REV. 481, 483 n.18. (2005).
116
See, e.g., Krysia Kubiak, History of the Women in the Law Division Gender Bias
Subcommittee, LAWYERS J., Oct. 27, 2006, at 4 (discussing slow pace and continuing reality of
sex inequality in the legal profession).
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more valuable than the poor. So rather than being a clever ruse or
tactical advantage, that move is a clear loser as it twice loops right back
into inequality.
How would materialist ontology impact the truth constructivist
argument? Basically, the constructivists argue that knowledge (i.e.,
verifiable statements of truth and falsehood) is constructed in an
intersubjective world. However, if truth statements are objectively
verifiable (i.e., if truth is an objective fact), then truth cannot be created
but only discovered. And if truth is not created, but “merely”
discovered, then the constructivist argument of a pure positive science
collapses. This is wonderful for science, but it is terrible for moral
relativism and explains why the relativist positions are generally
indefensible.
Having seen how post-modern epistemology collapses due to a
subjectivism, which ultimately denies the possibility of science, this
Article now turns to analyzing how this subjectivism cripples postmodern thought, preventing it from shaping vigorous normative
propositions about acknowledged social problems and, in fact, reinforces
patriarchy, hierarchy, and inequality by evacuating the moral sphere of
all values other than market values.
III. AXIOLOGICAL BASIS OF REALIST LEGAL METHOD
In Part II it was shown that the epistemological relativism was a nonstarter and that a moral theory was at least possible, as knowledge is
possible. Part III shows that an objective materialist moral theory is
possible. Morality, in materialist terms, is that which enables the human
animal to survive and not merely to survive, but also to prosper and
obtain the good life. With an objective morality, a normative discourse
outside of economic terms becomes possible, which in turn enables the
Left agenda to be implemented.
Several of the epistemological positions of relativism and
constructivism, if properly qualified, appear defensible. Aristotle
considered social justice as founded on an axiology, which was not
natural, but varied dependant on the society one examined.117 What
modernity calls social justice is, for Aristotle (who called it distributive or

See Aristotle, Politics, in THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH bk. II,
ch. V (Benjamin Jowett ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1966).
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geometric justice),118 not a natural, but a positive function and it varies
from society to society.119 Thus, it may not be surprising that the
axiological positions of relativism appear to be less subject to critique
than the epistemological positions. However, the axiological positions of
relativism are nonetheless hard to defend.
Moral relativism, reflected in Weber’s value-free neutrality,120
essentially asserts that either (1) moral values do not exist, that they are
in fact purely subjective elements of personal taste,121 or (2) even if moral
values do exist, they are not capable of cognition. Epistemological
relativism implies axiological relativism (though the reverse is not true),
which implies that the existence of moral values is unknowable.
However, some values, such as the inherent value of human life, are
universal.122 A rough factual moral standard can be the tendency of an
act or acts to foster the survival of the human species. Such a standard is
not subjective; it is based in the material world. Thus, it is capable of
scientific verification—that is, a materialist and not a platonic or neoplatonic formal idealist measure.
The reason that moral relativism appears attractive to those who
would critique Western values is because Western moral theory neither
prevented nor sanctioned witch hunts,123 crusades,124 slavery,125
imperialism,126 and world wars (the most obvious evidence of failure of
Western morality); it actually often encouraged such brutality and
See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 107 (D.P. Chase trans., Ernest Rhys ed., J. M.
Dent & Sons Ltd. 1911).
119
Aristotle, Politics, supra note 117, at bk. V.
120
MAX WEBER, “Objectivity” in Social Science and Social Policy, in THE METHODOLOGY OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 49 (Edward A. Shils & Heary A. Finch trans. & eds., 1949). Like
Hume, Weber is only proposing a prudent methodological counsel as a way to avoid
confusion.
121
“Understanding and ‘taste’ (by which merit is discovered) address themselves to
different issues. The one is the ‘discovery of truth and falsehood’ the other the importance
of things to us . . . their relevance for us as things to be responded to with favor or
disfavor.” Falk, supra note 35, at 554. “Because merit is discerned by taste it is not and
cannot be among the facts discovered by the understanding.” Id. at 551.
122
Basil Markesinis & Jörg Fedtke, The Judge as Comparatist, 80 TUL. L. REV. 11, 148 (2005).
123
Gila Stopler, Gender Construction and the Limits of Liberal Equality, 15 TEX. J. WOMEN &
L. 43, 51 (2005).
124
Andrew Coleman & Jackson Maogoto, Democracy’s Global Quest: A Noble Crusade
Wrapped in Dirty Reality?, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 175, 216 (2005).
125
See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Ten Precepts of American Slavery Jurisprudence:
Chief Justice Roger Taney’s Defense and Justice Thurgood Marshall’s Condemnation of the Precept
of Black Inferiority, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1695 (1996).
126
See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV.
881, 892 (1998).
118
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inhumanity.127 All too often, the old “moral” values were immoral.
However, rejecting a failed moral system is itself a moral choice. Moral
relativism can neither claim normative power nor reject other theories of
morality—that would require a value judgment. Relativists regard value
judgments as meaningless or impossible, and thus impermissible.
In fact, however, we can and do have objective material standards by
which we can judge the moral worth of any society—namely, the life
expectancy of its members and several other indicia as well (e.g., infant
mortality, literacy, homelessness). When radical scholars wish to reject
the failed Western morality, they should not take the relativist gambits
because (1) with no moral ground to stand on, their own arguments can
become relativized, and thus marginalized; and (2) rejecting moral
arguments leads to an augmentation in the power of the market as
arbiter of male power (because men control most of the money) and
individualism.
A. Hume and Kelsen
The presupposition that moral values are statements about facts, and
not themselves facts, can be traced to David Hume, who is the last major
root of erroneous post-modern thought that we will examine. Hume, in
turn, influenced Kelsen to adopt this dualism. For Hume and Kelsen,
there is an essential and ineluctable difference between statements of fact
(“is” statements) and statements about facts (“ought” statements).128 For
Hume, to state that there is insufficient food in Ireland to feed the Irish is
a statement of fact: either there are or are not X kilograms of wheat
needed to feed Y persons to avert starvation. A statement, however, that
there is insufficient food to feed the Irish (Somalians), and thus one
ought to donate food to them is, according to Hume, an “ought”
statement. Hume is generally presented as rejecting the viability of
“ought” statements as being implicit in “is” statements, and thus as
rejecting normative and practical syllogisms.129 That representation,
however, is inexact.130 Hume does infer norms.131 But proper normative
Hart, then Fuller describes this as the problem of “immoral morality.” Lon L. Fuller,
Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 636 (1958).
128
“It is generally accepted that the first person to deny the possibility of this inference
[from is to ought] was David Hume.” Capaldi, supra note 34, at 126.
129
HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, supra note 29 (asking readers to note the
distinction between is and ought statements and to explain how one can be derived from
the other—and nothing more nor anything less).
130
Hume’s point in the Inquiry, and in the ‘is-ought’ passage, if read in the
light of his comments in the Inquiry, is not to deny that merit is
cognitively derived from fact but to make sure that this derivation is
127
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inference,132 according to Hume, must be explicitly declared.133 In fact,
not mistaken for deduction. . . . The Inquiry, more so than the Treatise,
shows Hume’s concern in this matter to be two-edged: to ward off the
entrenched confusion of evaluative inference with demonstrative
proof; and to show what cognitive procedure is instead. . . . Hume’s
point is that the facts as known are the basis, not of a formal, but rather
of an experimental, proof . . . .
Werner David Falk, Hume on Is and Ought, CANADIAN J. PHIL. 562-63 (1976).
131
“Hume makes it clear that he believes that factual considerations can justify or fail to
justify moral rules.” MacIntyre, supra note 36, at 485, 489.
132
While Hume is skeptical about causality and thus deduction, he is even more radical
in his critique of induction:
[A]n assumption that arguments must be either deductive or
defective . . . is the very assumption which underlies Hume’s
skepticism about induction. And this skepticism is commonly treated
as resting upon, and certainly does rest upon, a misconceived
demand, . . . ”the demand that induction shall be shown to be really a
kind of deduction.” This is certainly an accurate way of characterizing
Hume’s transition from the premise that “there can be no demonstrative
arguments to prove, that those instances of which we have had no
experience resemble those of which we have had experience” to the
conclusion that “it is impossible for us to satisfy ourselves by our
reason, why we should extend that experience beyond those particular
instances which have fallen under our observation.” Part of Hume’s
own point is that to render inductive arguments deductive is a useless
procedure. We can pass from “The kettle has been on the fire for ten
minutes” to “So it will be boiling by now” (Strawson’s example) by
way of writing in some such major premise as “Whenever kettles have
been on the fire for ten minutes, they boil.” But if our problem is that
of justifying induction, then this major premise itself embodies an
inductive assertion that stands in need of justification. For the
transition which constitutes the problem has been justified in the
passage from minor premise to conclusion only at the cost of
reappearing, as question-beggingly as ever, within the major premise.
To fall back on some yet more general assertion as a premise . . . would
be to embark on a regress, possibly infinite and certainly pointless.
Id. at 487.
[S]ince Hume holds in some passages on induction at least that
arguments are deductive or defective, we could reasonably expect him
to maintain that since factual premises cannot entail moral
conclusion . . . there can be no connections between factual statements
and moral judgments . . . . [H]is remarks on “is” and “ought” are not
only liable to receive but have actually received a wrong
interpretation.
Id. at 488.
133
What I have so far argued is that Hume himself derives “ought” from
“is” in his account of justice. Is he then inconsistent with his own
doctrine in that famous passage? Someone might try to save Hume’s
consistency by pointing out that the derivation of “ought” from “is” in
the section on justice is not an entailment and that all Hume is denying
is that “is” statements can entail “ought” statements, and that this is
quite correct.
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the practical syllogism evident by the example of a famine is obvious.
We must feed the poor not only for pleasant altruistic reasons, but also
for practical ones: desperate people do desperate things; therefore,
alleviating famine reduces the likelihood of being attacked or robbed.
Positive reasons exist as well. By aiding the victims of famine, their
descendants may be more favorable to our descendants. Of course,
humanity also provides a practical justification to explain why the fact of
famine implies the act of feeding. We are social animals, we are not
cannibals, and part of what separates us from sharks is the fact that we
have compassion for the weak. All of this shows the practical measure of
morality as that which ensures species survival seems more or less self
evident and is, in all events, an objectively measurable universally
admitted good.
For Hume and Kelsen, the difference between “is” and “ought” is
ineluctable and essential. Hume presents this dualistic difference as a
postulate: he does not seek to prove the existence of that difference; he
sees it as fundamental (i.e., axiomatic). Hume thus does not raise or
refute the idea that “ought” statements might also be fact—an alternative
possibility this Article presents. The idea that Hume’s “law” holds that
statements of “is” and “ought” are fundamentally different and that the
one cannot be derived from the other is an interpolation of Hume based
on a presumption that he did not necessarily make. It is certainly not the
only possible interpretation of Hume.134 Further, Hume’s dualism is not
a necessary (i.e., inevitable, position, and generates theoretical
Id. at 492.
134
See, e.g., Barbara Winters, Hume on Reason, in I HUME STUD. 229, 234 (1979), available at
http://departments.oxy.edu/philosophy/hs/issues/v5n1/winters/winters-v5n1.pdf.
[Hume] is arguing that if reason is viewed on the traditional
conception, then reason does not determine us to have beliefs, e.g.
about the unobserved. But he does not stop with this result. Hume is
trying to give an account of human nature based on an examination of
how we in fact operate, and when he investigates the processes that go
on in us in coming to believe things, he comes to a discovery that we
do reason to our beliefs, but what goes on when we reason is not what
was traditionally thought to occur. His empirical investigation, then,
results in a different understanding of what reason is like, and when
reason is viewed according to his interpretation it can be seen that in
making the transition from the observed to the unobserved we are
reasoning and inferring. I see Hume, then, as rejecting reason under
one conception as inoperative in human affairs, but arguing that if
conceived in another way, reason does cause belief and influence
action. This interpretation, which I develop below, will resolve the
paradoxes and explain the inconsistency between Book I and Books II
and III.
Id.
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inconsistency). Moreover, courts infer from facts to norms (induction)135
and from norms to facts (deduction) all the time.
Those who interpolate Hume as arguing that “ought” can never be
deduced136 from “is” overstate Hume.137 He does not say that the
derivation of “ought” from “is” is impossible.138 He certainly does not
135
“Under stare decisis, contrary to Hume’s law, courts may indeed derive, to some
extent, an ‘ought’ from an ‘is,’ as the mere fact that cases were decided in a certain manner
in the past lends normative force toward deciding like cases in a like manner in the future.”
Steven Hetcher, Non-Utilitarian Negligence Norms and the Reasonable Person Standard, 54
VAND. L. REV. 863, 866 (2001).
136
In fact Hume criticizes deduction because what is taken for causal may only be—
perhaps even can only be—coincidence:
I have found that such an object has always been attended with such
an effect, and I foresee that other objects, which are, in appearance,
similar, will be attended with similar effects. I shall allow, if you
please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other; I
know in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the
inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that
reasoning.
4 DAVID HUME, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS 30 (Green & Grose eds., Scientia Verlag 1964)
[hereinafter HUME, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS]. “All inferences from experience therefore,
are effects of custom, not of reasoning.” Id.
All our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded on a species
of Analogy, which leads us to expect from any cause the same events,
which we have observed to result from similar causes. Where the
causes are entirely similar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference,
drawn from it, is regarded as certain and conclusive: nor does any man
ever entertain a doubt, where he sees a piece of iron, that it will have
weight and cohesion of parts; as in all other instances which have ever
fallen under his observation. But where the objects have not so exact a
similarity, the analogy is less perfect and the inference is less
conclusive; though it still has some force, in proportion to the degree of
similarity.
Id. at 85. “[M]en, learn many things from experience and infer, that the same events will
always follow from the same causes.” Id.
137
For example,
the standard interpretation of this passage takes Hume to be asserting
here that no set of nonmoral premises can entail a moral conclusion. It
is further concluded that Hume therefore is a prime opponent of what
Prior had called “the attempt to find a ‘foundation’ for morality that is
not already moral.” Hume becomes, in this light, an exponent of the
autonomy of morality and in this at least akin to Kant. In this paper, I
want to show that this interpretation is inadequate and misleading.
MacIntyre, supra note 36, at 486.
138
Falk noted:
[Hume] denies the deductibility of the latter from the former, as the
‘ought’ expresses ‘a new relation or affirmation’, ‘entirely different
from the others’. And this is commonly taken as saying that the ought
statement is ‘different’ and nondeducible, because it is no longer a
‘purely factual statement,’ to wit one that makes another ordinarily
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say there is no connection between them. Hume says that whoever
wishes to make the transition from “is” to “ought” must explicitly
enumerate exactly how they make that transition.139 In other words,
Hume presents a prudential council:140 it is wise for a philosopher to
explicitly show the connection between his normative and factual
statements,141 as this clarifies thinking both for the philosopher and his
audience.
Thus, Hume’s “law” is not a “law.”
It appears, on closer
examination, to be a mere prudential council. However, a critical
examination will also show that Hume’s “law” is in fact a trap for the
unwary.142 Hume does not say that moral values do not exist or cannot
be cognized. Rather, Hume’s critique is a much more subtle143 challenge
to all who wish to present moral choices as objective values to explicitly
do so. In other words, Hume merely and properly places the burden of
proof upon the movant to show that moral values exist objectively as
fact. As he presupposes a fundamental difference between “is” and
testable truth claim. However, recent criticism, by W.D. Hudson and
others, points out that Hume says other things seemingly inconsistent
with this. . . . How is one to understand Hume so as to save him here
from incoherence? It is said by Antony Flew that Hume really meant
that moral statements, rather than being about attitudes, serve to
express them. The real Hume was the ancestor of noncognitivism and
the ‘is-ought’ passage its early charter. By contrast, it is said by
Alasdair MacIntyre that really Hume did not mean to deny
deducibility. When he said that it ‘seemed inconceivable’, he meant
that it only seemed so without really being so
Falk, supra note 35, at 551.
139
“Hume’s point . . . is not to deny that merit is cognitively derived from fact but to
make sure that this derivation is not mistaken for deduction.” Id. at 562.
140
“Hume . . . in the celebrated passage does not mention entailment. What he does is to
ask how and if moral rules may be inferred from factual statements, and in the rest of Book
III of the Treatise he provides an answer to his own question.” MacIntyre, supra note 36, at
493.
141
“[I]n all reasonings from experience, there is a step taken by the mind, which is not
supported by any argument or process of understanding.” HUME, THE PHILOSOPHICAL
WORKS, supra note 136, at 36.
142
[O]ur willingness to accept the normative conception of ethics is so
deeply embedded that, when someone such as Hume challenges it,
we take the challenge as a classic defense. (I-O) is not the foundation
of normative ethics but its death warrant. Perhaps the shock value of
this revelation will lead us to reconsider what might be the most
important issue in twentieth-century philosophy.
Hudson, supra note 37, at 508.
143
“Hume’s attitude to induction is much more complex than appears in his more
skeptical moments and is therefore liable to misinterpretation—his remarks on ‘is’ and
‘ought’ are not only liable to receive but have actually received a wrong interpretation.”
MacIntyre, supra note 36, at 488.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss4/7

Engle: Knight's Gambit to Fool's Mate: Beyond Legal Realism

2007]

Beyond Legal Realism

1667

“ought,” this burden of proof cannot in fact be met, at least not within
Hume’s dualistic universe.144 The only way out of Hume’s trap is to
recognize it as dualism145 and reject the presumption of dualism. It
seems to me that Hume has not proven the existence of “is” versus
“ought,” but rather presumes it. Therefore, just as Hume can rightly
insist that the practical syllogism be founded on explicitly declared
presumptions, we can also insist that Hume prove his dualist position.
From a monist perspective, moral statements are simply statements
of facts—another “is” statement.146 For example, just as it is a fact that
the sun rises, it is also a fact that certain persons believe that others ought
not kill. Dualism runs throughout Western thought and is at the root of
alienation, division, separation, and suffering. Plato’s “mind” (eidos)
“matter” (hulé) distinction may be the first recorded example of dualism
in Western thought. It is not the last. Plato essentially presumes the
existence of the eidos as a postulate and never proves it, much as Hume
assumes a dualism which he does not prove.147 In fact, Plato’s dualism
cannot be proven, as material objects would not be the measure of proof
of mental forms. Thus, platonic formalism does not admit to proof by
materialist standards of science. Christianity makes a similar god/man
144
“Hume observes, that the good divides from the true. The standard for the latter is
‘eternal and inflexible’ in being founded on ‘the nature of things’; while that for the former
is variable, in depending on ‘the internal frame and constitution of animals.’” Falk, supra
note 35, at 565.
145
“In short, Hume is rejecting any normative conception of morals.” Capaldi, supra note
34, at 134. Is that statement circular? If normativity and morality are synonyms, then it is.
Hume has been accused by recent scholars of equivocation. A view upholding a univocal
reading of such terms, then attributes to Hume the position that we reason to and infer
such beliefs, that such transitions are ones of reasoning, but that reason doesn’t produce the
beliefs. And it must hold that, despite the fact that Hume concludes that animals have
reason from the fact that they make some of the same inferences that we do, he believes
that in the human realm such examples of reasoning are not produced by reason. It must
claim that whatever faculty is which Hume thinks reasons and infers, it is not reason.
Winters, supra note 134, at 233.
146
Hume is a materialist:
How does Hume defend his view of the derivation of morality from
interest? By appeal to the facts. How do we in fact induce someone to
do what is just? How do we in fact justify actions on our own part? In
observing what answers we have to give to questions like these, Hume
believes that his analysis is justified.
MacIntyre, supra note 36, at 491. But, unfortunately, Hume is also a dualist. “All
reasonings may be divided into two kinds, namely demonstrative reasoning, or that
concerning relations of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter of fact and
existence.” HUME, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, supra note 136, at 31. It is his dualism that
leads to his trouble with moral statements as fact. It sets him up for dichotomies like
“ideas” versus “impressions” and of course “is” and “ought.”
147
HUME, THE PHILOSOPHICAL WORKS, supra note 136, at 31.
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duality. We also see dualism in Descartes, who separates mind and
body, human and animal.
Aristotle would, however, disagree with Descartes’ man/animal
duality. For Aristotle, man is an animal—a rational talking animal.
Cartesian dualism, however, is very convenient for scientific
experimentation (vivisection), factory farming, and other abuse: if an
animal has no soul and is, as Descartes argues, a mere automaton, then it
cannot suffer. Those are the types of errors that dualism generates:
distinctions between “self” and “other,” which allow dehumanization
and destruction of the other leading ultimately to a Weberian
technocratic nightmare of bureaucratic specialization wherein each
individual—from the worker in the munitions plant, to the pilot, to the
bombardier—can ignore and deny that they are killing and maiming
other humans.
If dualism and (neo-)platonic idealism are fatally flawed, what about
monism and materialism? For the consistent empiricist, ideas do not
exist apart from the people who think them. Thus, to say that moral
values exist or not is senseless. What can be said is that the vast majority
of persons in all times and places hold certain fundamental values. It
can also be said that ideas have certain objective consequences. In both
senses ideas (and moral values are one type of idea) exist, but they have
no existence independent from the people who hold them. Ideas are
reflections of objects. After all, our bodies are made of matter and our
ideas, which are not congruent to material reality, are soon corrected,
whether we like it or not, by materiality. For the monist-materialist, “is”
and “ought” are not distinct and irreconcilable. Rather, “is” swallows
“ought” whole: “ought” statements are just another form of “is”
statements.148 How these critiques of post-modern epistemological and
moral theory influence law is the topic of the next section.

Hume’s rejection of “ought” as a special moral category is far more
revolutionary than his rejection of the traditional concept of causal
necessity. . . . One can no longer chant the refrain that “ought is not
deducible from is” because this presupposes the very thing that is to be
proved, and it is the very thing that Hume rejects, namely the existence
of peculiarly normative entities. In place of a normative conception,
Hume holds the view that ethics is an empirical science.
Capaldi, supra note 34. If that interpretation is correct, however, then Hume’s ethics are
flawed by epistemological dualism.
148
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IV. LEGAL METHOD
In Parts I through III, the ontological, epistemological, and
axiological bases of a theory for fundamental critique of American legalpolitical discourse were set out. A monist materialist ontology sets an
irrefutable base for the possibility of objective truth as measured by
correspondence between descriptions of reality and observations of
reality.149 Monism and platonic and neo-platonic noetic formalism are
contradictory.150 Materialism leads to a rejection of platonic forms.151
Further, Materialism leads one to reject epistemological relativism—
things do not become true simply because large numbers of people
believe them. Rather the truth is “out there” in the real world. Truth is
possible and is measured as a correspondence between objective reality
in the material world and descriptions of that reality in human language.
Human language too escapes irrelevancy because of its connection to
empirical reality. Thus, an objective morality is theoretically possible.
Morality took on an objective sense when it, consequent to the
materialist method proposed, is grounded not in erroneous formal noetic
views, but rather as a dispassionate materialist calculus of what
improves the life expectancy and caloric intake of humans. With an
objective measure of morality, we can make moral arguments that
circumvent economism, as they look at something more fundamental
than money: inalienable human dignity. Thus, the method proposed
leads us out of the cold world of cash and into the world of
humanitarianism. Human dignity is not fungible. Basic human rights
are inalienable. Thus, they cannot be comprehended in economic terms.
How does this understanding of ontology (materialist and monist),
epistemology (not nihilism or relativism, but skepticism), and axiology
(cognitivism not relativism) influence legal methods of argumentation?
Summarily, the realists’ rejection of formal logic was as much an error as
their rejection of morality as a category. By rehabilitating philosophical
(Aristotelian and scholastic) logic on a materialist basis, in place of its
usual noetic formalist basis, it is possible to apply objective morality to
the law. Thus, a unique and, in fact, new form of natural law reasoning
is proposed. A written law may conflict with customary moral law.
The Correspondence Theory of Truth, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2005),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence.
150
See, e.g., Monism, CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/
10483a.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007).
151
For a synoptic summary of the struggle of dualist neo-platonism against materialism
see, Neo-Platonism, CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10742b.
htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007).
149
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However, unlike traditional views of natural law, the existence and
resolution of conflict points between written law and unwritten law is
determined by a materialist analysis—a contextualized examination of
objective reality—and not by an idealistic deduction from amorphous ill
defined pure concepts. This argument is vectored through the failed
conceptual challenges posed by legal realism as the logical conclusion of
Parts I through III. By reviewing legal realism’s failure, the necessity of a
new way of thinking about the law becomes clear. Both formalism and
realism were partial and imperfect solutions to the problem of legal
interpretation. The theory of materialist natural law proposed is the
dialectical synthesis resulting from the opposition of formalism versus
realism, a relative opposition occurring within the super-structural
justifications of a given mode of production namely, late capitalism
(which is also called fast capitalism or casino capitalism).152
Epistemological and axiological choices shape method. Legal
realism was more or less the direct outcome of these various
epistemological and axiological currents. Legal realism dominated
United States legal thought from the 1930s to the 1980s, at which point it
was first challenged.153 It has now been overtaken by economic theories
of the law.154 However, so great was the influence of the realists—in fact
they set the stage for law and economics155—that their methodology
continues to heavily mark the law.

152
See, e.g., Robert Goldman, Stephen Papson & Noah Kersey, Speed: Through, Across, and
in —The Landscapes of Capital, http://www.uta.edu/huma/agger/fastcapitalism/1_1/
gpk2.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2007); Timothy W. Luke, Kanban Capitalism: Power, Identity,
and Exchange in Cyberspace, http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim589.htm (last visited
Feb. 14, 2007).
153
John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where
Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 849 n.39 (1991).
154
Sharon K. Hom, Equality, Social and Economic Justice, and Challenges for Public Interest
Lawyering, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 511, 516 (2005); Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A
New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 61, 88 (2005).
155
“Thus, critical race realism encompasses not only the goals and methodologies of the
broader critical race and feminist projects, but also some of the shared goals and
methodologies of legal realism and law and market economy theory (which I have
integrated into my critical race work elsewhere).” Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Race Realism:
Re-Claiming the Antidiscrimination Principle Through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law,
66 U. PITT. L. REV. 455, 457 (2005).
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A. Legal Realism vs. Formalism
Epistemologically, legal realism156 opposed psychology,157
voluntarism, and hints of class conflict against classical logic. The
realists quite successfully introduced a new terminology, substituting
negative words to describe institutions they wished to replace and
positive words to describe proposed replacements. Thus, classical logic
was relabeled formalism.158 Binary reasoning was relabeled, at best,
bright-line analysis,159 at worst, talismanic160 and, in all events, as rigid161
and inflexible. In contrast, the realists were flexibly162 balancing163

See, e.g., Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
157
See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 119-20 (Brentano’s 1970) (1930).
158
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). Holme’s
article is oft cited and illustrates exactly the problem of modernity—the separation of law
and morality consequent to relativism.
159
For example, “Some commentators discussing constitutional restrictions have
suggested reasons for successive prosecution in addition to those discussed above.
Professor Amar, for example, advocates ‘flexible, fact- and case-specific rules of due
process, rather than global, rigid, bright-line rules of double jeopardy.’” Anne Bowen
Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection from Successive Prosecution: A Proposed, Approach, 92 GEO.
L.J. 1183, 1284 (2004).
160
For example, “In the final analysis, the marriage movement will not relinquish the
talisman of marriage as fixed and natural instead of ‘ultimately dependent upon social and
economic structures.’” Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the Marriage Movement:
The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 305, 366 (2006).
161
I have referred to mechanical jurisprudence as scientific because those
who administer it believe it such. But in truth it is not science at all.
We no longer hold anything scientific merely because it exhibits a rigid
scheme of deductions from a priori conceptions. In the philosophy of
to-day, “theories are instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we
can rest.”
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 957
(1987). In fact, instrumentalism is the essence of opportunists anywhere. If anyone was
unscientific, it was the realists and their progeny, the post-modernists, not the formalists.
The old values were the wrong values; that does not mean there are no values.
162
Nor did balancing commit the Court to an overall theory of a
constitutional provision. The old conceptualization could be discarded
and a balancing approach could temporarily fill the theoretical void
while the Court groped towards a conception more attuned to the
times. Of course, there was the risk that balancing’s flexibility would
be viewed as unprincipled adjudication.
Aleinikoff, supra note 161, at 961.
163
See, e.g., Paul W. Kahn, The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance: The
Jurisprudence of Justice Powell, 97 YALE L.J. 1 (1987).
156
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competing interests.164 Rules were replaced with standards165 and laws
were replaced with norms.166
Methodologically, the legal realists advocated flexible multi-factor
balancing tests,167 which could and did consider interests not only of the
plaintiff and defendant, but also of society and third parties.168 They
opposed the (supposedly) rigid, deterministic, formally valid, but
substantively empty logic of classical legal scholarship. Formalism,
rigid, inflexible, and (supposedly) teleologically blind, could not defend
itself in its own terms against the flexible, visionary, balanced realists
because realism, unlike classical logic, pretended to understand and
deploy psychology and to ignore the form of reasoning and look to the
mechanics of the practical workings of power. Thus, realism could claim
to perceive issues that formalism (in the interest of objectivity) ignored,
and thus be a more accurate and persuasive world view.
The realists argued that rigid formal logic generally led to
substantive injustice.169 In its place, they argued for flexible guidelines,
which risk indeterminacy.170 But flexibility, while it permits the court to
decide cases on their individual merits, can also be criticized as
capricious,171 unprincipled, and open to abuse. The legal methods of the
realists, though flexible or supple, are also indeterminate. The legal
realists reject binary bright-line categorical analysis in favor of
multivariate balancing tests.172 That rejection is not generally wellfounded. Though the realists’ epistemology leads to an erroneous
general methodological rejection of categorical analyses, the alternative
methodology they propose is not necessarily more objective. Indeed,
164
Frank N. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 16, 40
(1988).
165
Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewellyn’s Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 543 (2000).
166
Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: Some Realism About the New Formalism
(with Particular Reference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 13, 50 (2001).
167
Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567, 2624 (1993).
168
“Methodologically, legal realism is a pluralistic view that marshals a multidisciplinary analysis of the constitutionality of speech incorporating historical, linguistic,
social and political insights.” Alexander Tsesis, The Boundaries of Free Speech, 8 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 141, 152 (2005).
169
For a brief overview of realism and an attempt to both criticize and ameliorate realist
discourse, see Anthony D’Amato, The Limits of Legal Realism, 87 YALE L. J. 468 (1978).
170
Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L.
REV. 1222 (1931).
171
Lynne Marie Kohm, A Reply to “Principles and Prejudice”: Marriage and the Realization
that Principles Win over Political Will, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 293, 325 (1996).
172
For a discussion of balancing tests in legal theory and pedagogy, see James Boyle, The
Anatomy of a Torts Class, 34 AM. U. L. REV. l003 (l985).
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how could it be given the subjectivism of the realists’ epistemological
and axiological assumptions? Both balancing tests and bright-line
categorical analyses are not necessarily well founded, but they can be if
their terms are certain. Terms are certain if they are empirically
verifiable. However, empirical verifiability, in a world of subjective
moral values, leaves but one standard—cash money. Thus, any attempt
to use legal realism to impel necessary fundamental reform to an ossified
constitutional structure is doomed from its inception. For realism
ultimately compels us, perhaps surprisingly, to the marketplace.
Contemporary legal epistemology follows the realists’ lead and
tends (incorrectly) to reject bright-line categorical tests and other
methods derived from formal logic on the following grounds:
While categorical analyses are unambiguous, they are, at
best, teleologically blind and, at worst, teleologically
vicious.
(a) When teleologically vicious, formal
manipulations are nothing more or less than the
mask of class dominance.173
(b)
When
teleologically
blind,
formal
manipulations ignore whether substantive
outcomes are just and elevate the procedural
form over the substantive result.174
The realists’ conclusion—laws of formal logic, such as tertium nondatur, the law of identity “A or not A,” and categorical bright-line
analysis—must be rejected in the name of substantive justice. In their
place, flexible (or manipulable) balancing tests should be adopted.175
The rejection of formal logic is, however, ill founded. While some
realists pretend to be post-modernists, applying value neutral language,
they do in fact make moral choices. However, their moral values are not
The legal realists, Tushnet explained, demonstrated the indeterminacy
of legal doctrine, which meant that rules and precedents could be
manipulated to produce often contradictory legal outcomes. The
result was, the realists argued, that the explanation for these outcomes
must be sought outside of the system of legal doctrine, in the sociology
of power.
Morton J. Horwitz, Mark Tushnet, Legal Historian, 90 GEO. L.J. 131, 131-32 (2001).
174
See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685 (1976).
175
See Eric Allen Engle, When is Fair Use Fair?: A Comparison of E.U. and U.S. Intellectual
Property Law, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 187 (2002).
173
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those of feudalism or even liberalism. Critical scholars reject patriarchy
and capitalism, which is a normative (i.e., moral) choice.176 This explains
why radical critique should not be quick to reject morality or
normativity, as radical discourse is also normative and must be if it
wishes to effectuate change.
Categorical analysis, a formalist method, requires an exact
methodology (i.e., terminological and empirical certitude and strict
application of formal logic). Recall, however, the linguistic critiques of
Saussure and Quine, which explain why categorical logic was rejected by
the realists. Since the realist revolution of the 1930s, categorical formal
methods are criticized and generally rejected as rigid, inflexible, and
formalism. However, early realists’ rejection of formal logic, which they
characterize as rationalization, is simplistic: the realists ignore that
formal logic and empiricism are perfectly compatible as methodological
tools in the search for truth. If balancing tests, favored by the teleological
interpretation realism prescribes, can be evaluated and determined
according to objective empirical evidence, then so too can bright-line
categorical analyses.
There is no empirical difference between
determining the weight to be assigned to a factor in a multi-variant
balancing test and determining whether a bright-line threshold has been
crossed. The realist argument that flexible “balancing tests” are better
than formalist, bright-line tests is thus empty.
This Article has just shown why the realist critique is overlysimplistic; that critique also goes too far. The realists argue that formal
logic is at least abused, if not misused. Logic can, of course, be abused.
However, the realists ignore that formal logic is only contingently, and
not necessarily, manipulable.177 The manipulability of formal logic is
contingent upon a combination of terminological inexactitude—which
can exist—and intellectual dishonesty: it is not inevitable. If all formal
logic were merely a manipulation designed to mask the raw exercise of
power, then logical argument would be pointless.178 Again, that would
force us into fascism’s volonté de puissance. For the strong, that is not a
problem, but supposedly radical critique claims to want to advance the
176
How can we distinguish norm and morés? The norm is that which is customary,
habitual and thus seen as normal. These terms seem synonymous.
177
This argument requires that one understand that contingent truth is only potentially
true depending upon circumstances whereas necessary truths are true in all times and
places.
178
A post-modernist paradox: If no truth exists, how can the truth that there be no truth
exist? This alone should demonstrate the flaw of epistemological nihilism and/or moral
relativism.
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interests of the poor, the downtrodden, and the suffering. Consequently,
radical critique will never be arguing from a powerful position where it
can simply force its objectives on the agenda. Rather, all altruistic efforts
at bettering the lot of those less fortunate must ultimately argue
persuasively from compassion because the dispossessed lack the
instruments of state power.
Not only does regarding formal logic as mere manipulation—the
mask of power—lead us to voluntarism and the fascist reductio, it also is
self-contradictory and leads to a conclusion which, like the paradox of
the unknowing knower, voids most nihilist discourse.
Logical
contradictions thus undermine most relativist theses, whether such
discourse is presented as legal realism or post-modernism. Members of
both schools of thought assert that there is no truth or that all truth is
relative. That position leads to an antinomy. It is illogical to use logic to
argue that one cannot use logic. If there were no truth, or if all truth
were relative (to what?), then statements such as “there is no truth” or
“all truth is relative” would be logically empty of meaning. But if such
statements are logically empty, they cannot be the foundation of an
argument for the result is infinite regress. The antinomic conclusion is
the inevitable conclusion which most post-modern and realist
epistemology leads to and must lead to if one takes their assertions of
truth nihilism or relativism seriously, and not as a mere sensationalist
foil for a healthy truth skepticism which they generally are.
Although post-modernism taken to its logical conclusion leads to an
impermissible antinomy, a qualified realism is admissible.
The
statement “the abuse of formal logic leads to some injustice” is perfectly
admissible (i.e., that statement is formally valid, empirically true, and
possibly even necessarily true). This qualified realism is admissible and
does not overstate the realist critique. Truth sceptics and realists have
some points—logic can be, and sometimes is, manipulated. But truth
sceptics and realists should be careful not to take their points too far lest
nihilism annihilate their own discourse. That annihilation—the negation
of the negation,179 so to speak—necessarily occurs whenever realists or
post-modernists assert a truth statement purporting to negate the
existence of truth statements. This annihilation happens, for example,
when they attempt to simultaneously assert that “all moral values are
relative” and “no truth exists.” Those two statements are, in fact,
logically incompatible. They cannot be asserted simultaneously in
179
Friedrich Engels, Anti-Dühring (1877), available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/
marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch11.htm.
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logical discourse. They are antinomic, the former, heterologically and,
the latter, autologically.
This leads to the conclusion that the realists overestimated the
difficulties of linguistic indeterminacy and formalism’s elevation of form
over substance. Thus, substituting interest balancing tests for bright-line
categorical tests may not have been necessary. Furthermore, interest
balancing tests are generally ambiguous. What factors are chosen? What
weight are the factors given? How is that weight measured? Thus,
realism is an imperfect solution to an ill-defined problem, as interest
balancing is just as manipulable as bright-line, categorical hermeneutics.
B. Realism Set the Stage for Law and Economics
Legal realism has given judges the necessary tools to allow the
deployment of their subjective will—in the search for substantive
justice—without any moral telos (final design) to guide that will. Despite
flaws in the relativists’ positions, their arguments have been so
successful that contemporary values generally are only considered in
market terms.180 Moral values are generally ignored as being subjective
and/or indemonstrable and/or unscientific in contemporary legal
discourse.181 As a result, economic analysis is ascendant. This is because
economic analysis can claim to be objective, and thus scientific.
Economic arguments appear to be objective because they appear to be
empirically quantifiable, therefore verifiable, and thus objective. Of
course, a searching critical regard shows that economic analysis carries
See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981). Posner’s arguments are
certainly coherent and internally consistent—but equating justice to the marketplace
requires several unrealistic assumptions (rational profit maximizing economic actors,
fungible goods, no transaction costs) and is in the end likely wrong. There are values
which are non-fungible: they’re called human rights. But see United States v. Carroll
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand’s test).
181
See, e.g., Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies In Public International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 81, 94 (1991). Purvis argues, incorrectly, that liberalism postulates that value is
subjective.
The second premise of liberalism is the principle of subjective value.
This radical epistemology emphasises that moral truth and moral
worth are subjective, because as an epistemological matter universal
morality is unknowable. There is no accessible “objective value,”
“intelligible essence,” “virtue,” or Platonic form. There can be “no
natural distinctions among things, nor any hierarchy of essences that
might serve as the basis for drawing up general categories of facts and
classifying particulars under those categories.”
Id. But Purvis confuses epistemological dualism with axiological cognitivism. It is
perfectly possible to be both an ontological or epistemological materialist and a moral
cognitivist.
180
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its own biases and that some objects do allow economic analysis—
markets with very few or even no actors, for an easy example.
Externalities182 and the question of fungibility also explain why
skepticism towards the universality of market values is justified.
Economic agents are not always rational profit maximizers.183 Goods are
not always fungible or alienable, nor should they always be.
The teleological critique of formalism presented by realism depends
upon an objectivist axiology, which realism helped to destroy.184
Realism’s inability to elaborate a viable axiology is one more reason why
the realist critique of legal methodology, which is ultimately a critique of
formalism’s supposedly absent teleology, failed.
If all moral values are merely subjective, then only economic values
are scientifically objective (i.e. quantifiable and verifiable). Thus, the
judicial willpower realism unleashed is now exercised to serve the
interests of the wealthy because only economic values can claim to be
objective in a world that holds moral values are intersubjective. Moral
values have been eclipsed by economic values because contemporary
epistemology is generally skeptical toward the existence of truth and
rejects the existence, or at least the cognizability, of objective moral
values. If “no truth exists” or “all values are relative”—statements that
were shown to be illogical but were nonetheless in vogue because they
are shocking (thus getting media attention), and their less extreme
versions, are well-founded—then economic empiricism is the only
remaining scientific argument. Taking the gambit of moral relativism in
an attempt to change failed values is a dead end. It prevents elucidating
any new values to replace the failed old ones. This vacuum is then filled
by “objective” economic values, which merely ensure the continuation
and even exacerbation of income inequality, patriarchy, and social
injustice.

182
Efficient markets “require that participants have perfect information, incur no
transaction costs, and that there are no externalities not reflected in the market
information . . . .” Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and
Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 169 n.295 (1988).
183
“[F]ew (if any) sellers are always rational profit-maximizers.” Tasty Baking Co. v.
Ralston Purina, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1250, 1275 (E.D. Pa. 1987); see also USX Corp. v. United
States, 12 C.I.T. 205, 210 (1988).
184
These facts help to explain some of the paralysis and cacophony in contemporary
legal theory, especially in contemporary American legal theory.
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C. Critique of Realist Legal Method
Rather than arguing within the presumption that economic value is
the only value, or the only objective value, methodological critiques of
economic analyses are more effective when they question the
epistemology upon which balancing tests are founded.
An
epistemological critique of the realists and post-modernists is possible
because truth negationist epistemology is incorrect. True statements do
in fact exist. It is true that not all arguments are verifiable and that not
all arguments are falsifiable. It is also true, however, that some
arguments may be verified, or at least falsified, and that not all
arguments that are falsifiable necessarily imply a verifiable contrary
position. Thus, the critiques of formalism may not be as strong as
commonly believed. Further, we can use formal logic to question the
validity of balancing tests. Are balancing tests objective or predictable?
If they are not, are they manipulable? What does that imply for the rule
of law?
Limiting the inquiry here to the mechanics of legal balancing tests,
the first question is whether the balancing tests proposed by realists are,
or can be, on solid empirical foundations. When balancing tests are
applied by relativists, they lose their material foundation. Even with a
proper material foundation, however, balancing tests are still
questionable. Are balancing tests truly objective? Do they lead to
foreseeable, predictable outcomes?
The manipulability even of
empirically justified balancing tests arises in the answers to two
questions: (1) Which factors are chosen to be balanced? (Note that a
pure economic analysis will exclude certain factors and privilege others);
and (2) What weight are the chosen factors given?185 The strength of
economic analysis is its ability to provide an objective standard by which
to weigh various factors in balancing tests—if we assume that markets
exist and clear, goods are fungible, and there are no significant
externalities, all of which are large assumptions. However, sometimes
some or all of those assumptions are true. But more often than not, one
or more of those criteria will be lacking in any market analysis.
The answers to the questions “which factors” and “what weight” are
ultimately determined not by democratic process (which at least would
support intersubjectivism), but rather by judicial decision. One of the
principled reasons for judicial reluctance to intervene in political issues
Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225,
1254 (1999).
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prior to 1937 was that judicial decisions are un-democratic. Court
judgments were seen as legitimate prior to the realists because they were
the product of logic. But if logic and judicial decision-making are
unconnected or unconnectable, then judicial decision-making is just an
undemocratic exercise of raw power. If judicial willpower (as opposed
to objective reasoning) determines “which factors” and “what weight,”
then we are brought out of the pseudo-objective world of
intersubjectivism into exactly the legal world the realists predicted and
criticized—one in which reason is rationalization. Realism thus scores at
least two own-goals: first, it opens the door to law and economics, and,
second, it is a self-fulfilling prophecy and reduces legal decision to mere
rationalization. However, while legal realism’s prophecies may appear
self-fulfilling, they are not. A monist materialism approach would lead
to objectively verifiable and foreseeable outcomes.
Another methodological critique of realism and its progeny looks
within realism to compare “vague,” “manipulable,” and “teleologically
blind” outcomes, generated by supposedly flawed formalism and
categorical analysis that (supposedly) ignore substantive justice, with the
outcomes generated by balancing tests.186 In fact, we can see that
balancing tests are no less vague and, in fact, more manipulable than socalled “bright-line tests” and “talismans.”
Balancing tests imply
multiple poles of interest and more terms of analysis, and thus provide
greater room for the exercise of de facto legislative power—by judges.
Realism represents no progress toward objectivity.
Despite these facts:
(1) The realists’ epistemology can be defended, though
only in a qualified manner. Truth negationism is
inadmissible, but truth skepticism is permissible.
(2) The realists’ preferred methodology, balancing tests,
can be just as objective as categorical bright-line analyses
if, and only if, factors are specified and objectively
weighed.

See, e.g., Balancing Tests, Legal Theory Lexicon, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_
theory_lexicon/2004/02/legal_theory_le_1.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2007); Iddo Porat, The
Transformation of American Constitutional Balancing: The History of Constitutional Balancing
from Holmes to the Present Day (2005), (unpublished article), available at http://law.bepress.
com/expresso/eps/733/.
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(3) The realists’ methodology is no more capricious than
categorical analyses because it is empirically grounded
upon data which are often, though not necessarily,
quantifiable and verifiable.
This explains why so much super-structural foment has had so little
actual affect on relations of production within the United States. In the
1930s, America faced an economic crisis that, with the exception of
hyperinflation, was just as serious as that facing Germany at that time.187
The democratic response to the economic crisis was less effective than
the fascist response. The war fought and won, trends already begun in
1917—the feminization of the workplace188 and the civil rights
movement—intensified. Yet, these massive social movements had only
little influence on the law. Likewise, the counterculture protests of the
1960s were also a radical change in sexual and race relations—with few
formal legal impacts, especially when viewed in the long term.189 “Black
is beautiful,” “affirmative action,” and “women’s liberation” have all
been contained and defanged as bases for radical critique of the
American empire, which is bad for Americans because the only critique
possible is the critique of the gun carried out by the Intifadah, by Hamas,
the insurgents, and those labeled terrorists. Is a boy throwing stones at a
tank in his neighborhood a terrorist? What about the jet jock 10,000 feet
up raining death down on him and his relatives? Today we see the same
types of radical protest gathering that rocked the world in the 1960s. If
From 1930 to 1940, federal spending tripled in volume as new
programs were created and old ones expanded in a costly effort to
revive the collapsing economy. As a share of the gross domestic
product (GDP), federal spending rose from 3.4 percent in 1930 to 9.8
percent in 1940. Yet, despite this unprecedented surge in spending,
America’s GDP fell by 27 percent part way through the decade and by
1938 was less than two percent above its 1929 level. For American
workers, the failure of this spending spree to do anything more than
expand the deficit and bureaucracy was devastating. The number of
unemployed more than doubled from 2.8 million at the beginning of
the decade to 6.9 million in 1940.
Dr. Ronald D. Utt, Lessons on How NOT to Stimulate the Economy (2001), available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Budget/BG1495.cfm.
188
George Mason University, “Continued Employment after the War?”: The Women’s Bureau
Studies Postwar Plans of Women Workers, http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/7027/ (last
visited Feb. 14, 2007).
189
E.g., Daniel Gutman & Tyler Lewis, In the Wake of Proposal 2’s Passage, Affirmative
Action Supporters Look to the Future (Dec. 21, 2006), available at http://www.civilrights.org/
issues/affirmative/remote-page.jsp?itemID=29141557. “With the passage of Proposal 2,
Michigan becomes the third state after California and Washington to ban via ballot
initiative affirmative action and equal opportunity initiatives in state contracting,
education, and employment.” Id.
187
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they are to have any impact on the legal system, then they require a
correct theoretical base on which to found arguments and make
demands of the system that profits from oil wars.
Under the right circumstances, these subsurface waves of conflict
break out into tempests in the “real world” of praxis. The war in Iraq and
the abject failure of the United States government to do anything but
squander resources may provide those circumstances. Conditions are
aligning, which are going to force people into asking radical questions.
Why is the United States fighting wars for oil? Why does it not consider
alternatives, such as ethanol, bicycles, and trains? The real question of
9/11 is not who knocked down the towers, but rather why the towers
were knocked down. The real question in Iraq is not how to win an
unwinnable war. The real question is why is the United States fighting a
war in a country that not only did not regard bin Laden as an ally, but
also saw him as an enemy and did not fund him? An even tougher
question that deserves to be asked is why the C.I.A. funded bin Laden in
the first place? These facts show that the United States military
industrial complex is beyond civilian control and must be reined in,
which requires fundamental reordering of American intellectual
discourse around the idea of natural law. This Article has attempted to
show just how that can be done.
V. CONCLUSION: BEYOND LEGAL REALISM
This Article explains some of the foundations of contemporary legal
method and shows how post-modernism tends to take these theories too
far. It also shows that contemporary understandings of Hume go too far
in attributing positions to him that he did not enunciate. Hume never
refutes the existence or possible existence of morality, either as a concept
or an object of cognition. Rather, Hume “merely” seeks to place the
burden on whoever seeks to express moral choice to show the connection
between normative and positive statements. However, that is a trap
because the transition cannot be proven in Hume’s dualistic universe.
Hume’s trap, while devastatingly subtle, is founded on a false dualistic
postulate, which he presents as self-evident, that there be a fundamental
difference between statements of fact and statements about fact (i.e.,
between “is” and “ought”). Hume is one more example of dualism
creating
false
dichotomies,
“man/woman,”
“master/slave,”
“man/animal,” “self/other,” etc.
Hume’s dualist ontology and
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epistemology190 (“is”/”ought”) parallels Descartes’ ontological dualism
(god:man::man:animal)
and
Plato’s
epistemological
dualism
(form>matter).
The bitter irony is that the very people who claim to recognize and
wish to end the problem of suffering arising out of dualism are doing
exactly what they should not. Post-modernism and legal realism,
instead of concentrating on the dualism that is the source of the problem
of alienation and oppression, contents itself with ineffective and selfdefeating gambits that backfire by unknowingly replacing moral values
with economical ones.
The cognition of moral values as statements of social fact (i.e., that X
persons in Y region believe in the truth of statement Z) is a better
explanation of how statements such as “there is insufficient food in
Ireland” and “thus we must donate food” can escape from enthymeme
and become well formed practical syllogisms. Hume does not overtly
reject Aristotle’s practical reasoning (phroenesis) and the practical
syllogism that embodies it. Instead, Hume sets a trap for the unwary: he
places the burden of proof that a normative or practical syllogism is wellformed squarely on the shoulders of he who presents it—where it
belongs—and leaves open the relativist possibility as a gambit. Postmodernism took that gambit and falls into his trap. This explains why
the heir to legal realism, Critical Legal Studies, is going nowhere.191
The implication of these theoretical positions for legal methodology
is that legal methods predicated upon overly-broad interpretations of
Nietzsche and Hume, such as legal realism and post-modernism, must
be reconsidered. The post-war rise of legal balancing and the pejorative
characterization of objective logic as “formalism” are errors in legal
methodology, which rob law of objectivity and open it to accusations of
perpetrating systemic injustice. Such accusations are often wellfounded. But to identify a problem correctly (unfair laws) does not
necessarily mean that one has also identified the correct solution
(rejection of formal logic). Such was the case of the legal realists and the

190
“According to Hume, all mental activities are perceptions. Perceptions are of two
kinds, impressions and ideas. . . . Reason is of two kinds: comparing ideas (relations of
ideas) and inferring matters of fact . . . .” Capaldi, supra note 34, at 126. It is exactly this
dualism which the author regards as the source of conflict in Western theory and praxis.
191
Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”) failed due to a lack of radical commitment. CLS theory
was closet Marxism and so went nowhere because it did not commit to Marx and was
decimated by the same relativism that undercut realism. See, e.g., E. Dana Neacsu, CLS
Stands for Critical Legal Studies, if Anyone Remembers, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 415 (2000).
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post-modernists. Without the correct tools to combat injustice, no
progress would be possible.
To develop correct legal methods tools we must first understand and
reject dualism and philosophical idealism (platonic formalism and its
eidos). Platonism is the usual root of natural law thinking, but not a
necessary one. We must develop an objective axiology based on a
monist-materialist foundation. With correct epistemology and axiology,
we can then examine legal methodology as it manifests in cases and
constellations of cases to determine the best methods to attain both
transactional (arithmetic) and social (geometric) justice. Undoubtedly,
new legal methods will arise and old ones are reformed or rejected.
Consequently, theory will be put into practice in the interests of justice.
That is a much greater task than could be outlined in this Article, but it is
a first step to attaining that goal.
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